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Supreme Court Decisions, 1998/99 Term (SC_98)

Adobe Acrobat PDF versions of Supreme Court Decisions from the 1998-1999 term. From the HERMES project.

981478zd.pdf  07/01/99     25695 bytes  (174 hits)
              98-1478
              Writ of Certiorari denied. Dissent.

R089.pdf      07/01/99     14636 bytes  (121 hits)
              R089; 6/23/99.  The Patent and Plant Variety
              Protection Remedy Clarification Act's abrogation
              of States' sovereign immunity is invalid because
              it cannot be sustained as legislation enacted to
              enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
              Amendment's Due Process Clause.   Syllabus.
              98-531 Syllabus Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Rehnquist,C.J.
              Sovereign-immunity Patents Fourteenth-Amdt.

R089A.pdf     07/01/99     66929 bytes  (38 hits)
              R089A; 6/23/99.  The Patent and Plant Variety
              Protection Remedy Clarification Act's abrogation
              of States' sovereign immunity is invalid because
              it cannot be sustained as legislation enacted to
              enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
              Amendment's Due Process Clause.  Stevens, J.,
              dissenting.
              98-531 Dissent Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Stevens,J.
              Sovereign-immunity Patents Fourteenth-Amdt.

R089O.pdf     07/01/99     66803 bytes  (34 hits)
              R089-O; 6/23/99.  The Patent and Plant Variety
              Protection Remedy Clarification Act's abrogation
              of States' sovereign immunity is invalid because
              it cannot be sustained as legislation enacted to
              enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
              Amendment's Due Process Clause.  Rehnquist, C.
              J., opinion.
              98-531 Opinion Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Rehnquist,C.J.
              Sovereign-immunity Patents Fourteenth-Amdt.

R090.pdf      07/01/99     13996 bytes  (43 hits)
              R090; 6/23/99.  The federal courts have no
              jurisdiction over a Lanham Act suit against
              Florida Prepaid because Florida's sovereign
              immunity was neither validly abrogated by the
              Trademark Remedy Clarification Act nor
              voluntarily waived by Florida's activities in
              interstate commerce.  Syllabus.
              98-149 Syllabus Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Trademarks
              Sovereign-immunity Scalia,J. Waiver-of-immunity

R090A.pdf     07/01/99     12575 bytes  (23 hits)
              R090A; 6/23/99.  The federal courts have no
              jurisdiction over a Lanham Act suit against
              Florida Prepaid because Florida's sovereign
              immunity was neither validly abrogated by the
              Trademark Remedy Clarification Act nor
              voluntarily waived by Florida's activities in
              interstate commerce.  Stevens, J., dissenting.
              98-149 Dissent Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Trademarks
              Sovereign-immunity Stevens,J. Waiver-of-immunity

R090B.pdf     07/01/99     46643 bytes  (17 hits)
              R090B; 6/23/99.  The federal courts have no
              jurisdiction over a Lanham Act suit against
              Florida Prepaid because Florida's sovereign
              immunity was neither validly abrogated by the
              Trademark Remedy Clarification Act nor
              voluntarily waived by Florida's activities in
              interstate commerce.  Breyer, J., dissenting.
              98-149 Dissent Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Trademarks
              Sovereign-immunity Breyer,J. Waiver-of-immunity

R090O.pdf     07/01/99     87475 bytes  (16 hits)
              R090-O; 6/23/99.  The federal courts have no
              jurisdiction over a Lanham Act suit against
              Florida Prepaid because Florida's sovereign
              immunity was neither validly abrogated by the
              Trademark Remedy Clarification Act nor
              voluntarily waived by Florida's activities in
              interstate commerce.  Scalia, J., opinion. 
              98-149 Opinion Florida-Prepaid-Ed.-Bd.
              College-Savings-Bank Trademarks
              Sovereign-immunity Scalia,J. Waiver-of-immunity

R091.pdf      07/01/99     22187 bytes  (63 hits)
              R091; 6/23/99.  Congress' Article I powers do not
              include the power to subject nonconsenting States
              to private suits for damages in state courts;
              Maine did not waive its sovereign immunity with
              regard to state-court actions filed under the
              Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.  Syllabus.
              98-436 Syllabus Alden Maine Sovereign-immunity
              FLSA Kennedy,J. ArticleI

R091A.pdf     07/01/99    192163 bytes  (31 hits)
              R091A; 6/23/99.  Congress' Article I powers do
              not include the power to subject nonconsenting
              States to private suits for damages in state
              courts; Maine did not waive its sovereign
              immunity with regard to state-court actions filed
              under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 
              Souter, J., dissenting.
              98-436 Dissent Alden Maine Sovereign-immunity
              FLSA Souter,J. ArticleI

R091O.pdf     07/01/99    155734 bytes  (27 hits)
              R091-O; 6/23/99.  Congress' Article I powers do
              not include the power to subject nonconsenting
              States to private suits for damages in state
              courts; Maine did not waive its sovereign
              immunity with regard to state-court actions filed
              under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 
              Kennedy, J., opinion.
              98-436 Opinion Alden Maine Sovereign-immunity
              FLSA Kennedy,J. ArticleI

R092.pdf      07/01/99     25249 bytes  (18 hits)
              R092; 6/23/99.  The lower courts erred in
              certifying and affirming the certification of a
              mandatory settlement class on a limited fund
              theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
              23(b)(1)(B) in asbestos personal injury
              litigation.  Souter, J., opinion.
              97-1704 Opinion Ortiz Fibreboard-Corp. Asbestos
              Souter,J. F.R.Civ.P. 23 Class-actions

R092A.pdf     07/01/99      7352 bytes  (12 hits)
              R092A; 6/23/99.  The lower courts erred in
              certifying and affirming the certification of a
              mandatory settlement class on a limited fund
              theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
              23(b)(1)(B) in asbestos personal injury
              litigation.  Rehnquist, C. J., concurring.
              97-1704 Concur Ortiz Fibreboard-Corp. Asbestos
              Rehnquist,C.J. F.R.Civ.P. 23 Class-actions

R092B.pdf     07/01/99     68106 bytes  (8 hits)
              R092B; 6/23/99.  The lower courts erred in
              certifying and affirming the certification of a
              mandatory settlement class on a limited fund
              theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
              23(b)(1)(B) in asbestos personal injury
              litigation.  Breyer, J., dissenting.
              97-1704 Dissent Ortiz Fibreboard-Corp. Asbestos
              Breyer,J. F.R.Civ.P. 23 Class-actions

R092O.pdf     07/01/99    150172 bytes  (14 hits)
              R092-O; 6/23/99.  The lower courts erred in
              certifying and affirming the certification of a
              mandatory settlement class on a limited fund
              theory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
              23(b)(1)(B) in asbestos personal injury
              litigation.  Souter, J., opinion.
              97-1704 Opinion Ortiz Fibreboard-Corp. Asbestos
              Souter,J. F.R.Civ.P. 23 Class-actions

R093.pdf      07/01/99      9494 bytes  (40 hits)
              R093; 6/24/99.  Abusive filer is denied leave to
              proceed in forma pauperis on all future
              certiorari and extraordinary writ petitions in
              noncriminal cases.  Per Curiam.
              PerCuriam Whitfield Texas 98-9085 Abusive-filings
              Frivolous IFP Certiorari

R079.pdf      06/22/99     18841 bytes  (40 hits)
              R079; 6/21/99.  Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison
              Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limits attorney's
              fees for postjudgment monitoring services
              performed in prisoner suits after the Act's
              effective date, but does not limit fees for
              monitoring performed before that date.  Syllabus.
              98-262 Syllabus Martin Hadix 42USC1997e(d)(3)
              O'Connor,J. Attorney's-fees Prisoners

R079A.pdf     06/22/99     13163 bytes  (31 hits)
              R079A; 6/21/99.  Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison
              Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limits attorney's
              fees for postjudgment monitoring services
              performed in prisoner suits after the Act's
              effective date, but does not limit fees for
              monitoring performed before that date.  Scalia,
              J., concurring in part and concurring in the
              judgment.
              98-262 Concur Martin Hadix 42USC1997e(d)(3)
              Scalia,J. Attorney's-fees Prisoners

R079B.pdf     06/22/99     30863 bytes  (9 hits)
              R079B; 6/21/99.  Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison
              Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limits attorney's
              fees for postjudgment monitoring services
              performed in prisoner suits after the Act's
              effective date, but does not limit fees for
              monitoring performed before that date.  Ginsburg,
              J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
              98-262 Concur/Dissent Martin Hadix
              42USC1997e(d)(3) Ginsburg,J. Attorney's-fees
              Prisoners

R079O.pdf     06/22/99     54104 bytes  (13 hits)
              R079-O; 6/21/99.  Section 803(d)(3) of the Prison
              Litigation Reform Act of 1995 limits attorney's
              fees for postjudgment monitoring services
              performed in prisoner suits after the Act's
              effective date, but does not limit fees for
              monitoring performed before that date.  O'Connor,
              J., opinion.
              98-262 Opinion Martin Hadix 42USC1997e(d)(3)
              O'Connor,J. Attorney's-fees Prisoners

R080.pdf      06/22/99     14583 bytes  (58 hits)
              R080; 6/21/99.  The Eighth Amendment does not
              require that a jury be instructed as to the
              consequences of their failure to agree on a
              verdict; in this death penalty case, certain
              aggravating factors found by the jury were not
              vague, overbroad, or duplicative in violation of
              that Amendment.  Syllabus.
              Jones U. S. Syllabus 97-9361 Thomas,J.
              Eighth-Amdt. Jury-unanimity Death-penalty

R080A.pdf     06/22/99     65903 bytes  (25 hits)
              R080A; 6/21/99.  The Eighth Amendment does not
              require that a jury be instructed as to the
              consequences of their failure to agree on a
              verdict; in this death penalty case, certain
              aggravating factors found by the jury were not
              vague, overbroad, or duplicative in violation of
              that Amendment.  Ginsburg, J., dissenting.
              Jones U. S. Dissent 97-9361 Ginsburg,J.
              Eighth-Amdt. Jury-unanimity Death-penalty

R080O.pdf     06/22/99     99686 bytes  (18 hits)
              R080-O; 6/21/99.  The Eighth Amendment does not
              require that a jury be instructed as to the
              consequences of their failure to agree on a
              verdict; in this death penalty case, certain
              aggravating factors found by the jury were not
              vague, overbroad, or duplicative in violation of
              that Amendment.  Thomas, J., opinion.
              Jones U. S. Opinion 97-9361 Thomas,J.
              Eighth-Amdt. Jury-unanimity Death-penalty

R081.pdf      06/22/99     21794 bytes  (11 hits)
              R081; 6/21/99.  This case was properly removed to
              federal court under the federal officer removal
              statute; the Tax Injunction Act does not bar
              federal-court adjudication; Jefferson County's
              "license or privilege tax" operates as a
              nondiscriminatory tax on federal judges'
              compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act
              of 1939 consents.  Syllabus.
              98-10 Syllabus Jefferson-County Acker
              28USC1442(a)(3) Ginsburg,J. 28USC1341 4USC111

R081A.pdf     06/22/99     21846 bytes  (16 hits)
              R081A; 6/21/99.  This case was properly removed
              to federal court under the federal officer
              removal statute; the Tax Injunction Act does not
              bar federal-court adjudication; Jefferson
              County's "license or privilege tax" operates as a
              nondiscriminatory tax on federal judges'
              compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act
              of 1939 consents.  Scalia, J., concurring in part
              and dissenting in part.
              98-10 Concur/Dissent Jefferson-County Acker
              28USC1442(a)(3) Scalia,J. 28USC1341 4USC111

R081B.pdf     06/22/99     53640 bytes  (4 hits)
              R081B; 6/21/99.  This case was properly removed
              to federal court under the federal officer
              removal statute; the Tax Injunction Act does not
              bar federal-court adjudication; Jefferson
              County's "license or privilege tax" operates as a
              nondiscriminatory tax on federal judges'
              compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act
              of 1939 consents.  Breyer, J., concurring in part
              and dissenting in part.
              98-10 Concur/Dissent Jefferson-County Acker
              28USC1442(a)(3) Breyer,J. 28USC1341 4USC111

R081O.pdf     06/22/99     64931 bytes  (5 hits)
              R081-O; 6/21/99.  This case was properly removed
              to federal court under the federal officer
              removal statute; the Tax Injunction Act does not
              bar federal-court adjudication; Jefferson
              County's "license or privilege tax" operates as a
              nondiscriminatory tax on federal judges'
              compensation, to which the Public Salary Tax Act
              of 1939 consents.  Ginsburg, J., opinion.
              98-10 Opinion Jefferson-County Acker
              28USC1442(a)(3) Ginsburg,J. 28USC1341 4USC111

R082.pdf      06/22/99     13277 bytes  (73 hits)
              R082; 6/21/99.  The "automobile exception" to the
              Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not
              require a separate finding of exigency in
              addition to a probable cause finding.  Per
              Curiam. 
              98-1062

R082A.pdf     06/22/99      6751 bytes  (29 hits)
              R082A; 6/21/99.  The "automobile exception" to
              the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does
              not require a separate finding of exigency in
              addition to a probable cause finding.  Breyer,
              J., dissenting.
              98-1062

R083.pdf      06/22/99      9923 bytes  (11 hits)
              R083; 6/21/99.  Abusive filer is denied leave to
              proceed in forma pauperis on all future
              certiorari petitions in noncriminal cases.  Per
              Curiam.
              PerCuriam 98-8952 Fertel-Rust Milwaukee-Mental-He
              alth Abusive-filings IFP Frivolous

R084.pdf      06/22/99     18104 bytes  (99 hits)
              R084; 6/22/99.  Where corrective lenses allow the
              severely myopic petitioners to function
              identically to individuals without a similar
              impairment, they have filed to allege that they
              are "disabled" within the meaning of the
              Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
              Syllabus.
              97-1943 Syllabus Sutton United-Air-Lines-Inc.
              O'Connor,J.

R084A.pdf     06/22/99      8687 bytes  (46 hits)
              R084A; 6/22/99.  Where corrective lenses allow
              the severely myopic petitioners to function
              identically to individuals without a similar
              impairment, they have filed to allege that they
              are "disabled" within the meaning of the
              Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
              Ginsburg, J., concurring.
              97-1943 Concur Sutton United-Air-Lines-Inc.
              Ginsburg,J.

R084B.pdf     06/22/99     67675 bytes  (25 hits)
              R084B; 6/22/99.  Where corrective lenses allow
              the severely myopic petitioners to function
              identically to individuals without a similar
              impairment, they have filed to allege that they
              are "disabled" within the meaning of the
              Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
              Stevens, J., dissenting.
              97-1943 Dissent Sutton United-Air-Lines-Inc.
              Stevens,J. ADA 42USC12102(2)(A),(C) Disability

R084C.pdf     06/22/99     10673 bytes  (28 hits)
              R084B; 6/22/99.  Where corrective lenses allow
              the severely myopic petitioners to function
              identically to individuals without a similar
              impairment, they have filed to allege that they
              are "disabled" within the meaning of the
              Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  Breyer,
              J., dissenting.
              97-1943 Dissent Sutton United-Air-Lines-Inc.
              Breyer,J. ADA 42USC12102(2)(A),(C) Disability

R084O.pdf     06/22/99     64396 bytes  (35 hits)
              R084-O; 6/22/99.  Where corrective lenses allow
              the severely myopic petitioners to function
              identically to individuals without a similar
              impairment, they have filed to allege that they
              are "disabled" within the meaning of the
              Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 
              O'Connor, J., opinion.
              97-1943 Opinion Sutton United-Air-Lines-Inc.
              O'Connor,J. ADA 42USC12102(2)(A),(C) Disability

R085.pdf      06/22/99     13008 bytes  (48 hits)
              R085; 6/22/99.  Under the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990, the determination
              whether petitioner's impairment "substantially
              limits" one or more major life activities is made
              with reference to the mitigating measures he
              employs; petitioner is not "regarded as disabled"
              because of his high blood pressure.  Syllabus.
              97-1992 Syllabus Murphy United-Parcel-Service-Inc
              . ADA O'Connor,J. Disability 42USC12102(2)(A),(C)

R085A.pdf     06/22/99      7368 bytes  (38 hits)
              R085A; 6/22/99.  Under the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990, the determination
              whether petitioner's impairment "substantially
              limits" one or more major life activities is made
              with reference to the mitigating measures he
              employs; petitioner is not "regarded as disabled"
              because of his high blood pressure.  Stevens, J.,
              dissenting.
              97-1992 Dissent Murphy United-Parcel-Service-Inc.
              ADA Stevens,J. Disability 42USC12102(2)(A),(C)

R085O.pdf     06/22/99     27208 bytes  (46 hits)
              R085-O; 6/22/99.  Under the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990, the determination
              whether petitioner's impairment "substantially
              limits" one or more major life activities is made
              with reference to the mitigating measures he
              employs; petitioner is not "regarded as disabled"
              because of his high blood pressure.  O'Connor,
              J., opinion.
              97-1992 Opinion Murphy United-Parcel-Service-Inc.
              ADA O'Connor,J. Disability 42USC12102(2)(A),(C)

R086.pdf      06/22/99     18120 bytes  (39 hits)
              R086; 6/22/99.  An employer's conduct need not be
              independently "egregious" to satisfy 42 U. S. C.
              §1981a(b)(1)'s requirements for a punitive
              damages award, although evidence of egregious
              misconduct may be used to meet the employee's
              burden of proof; even assuming that petitioner
              employee has met that burden, she must impute
              liability for punitive damages to respondent. 
              Syllabus.
              Kolstad American-Dental-Assn. Syllabus 98-208
              42USC1981a(b)(1) Title-VII Punitive-damages
              O'Connor,J.

R086A.pdf     06/22/99      6897 bytes  (15 hits)
              R086A; 6/22/99.  An employer's conduct need not
              be independently "egregious" to satisfy 42 U. S.
              C. §1981a(b)(1)'s requirements for a punitive
              damages award, although evidence of egregious
              misconduct may be used to meet the employee's
              burden of proof; even assuming that petitioner
              employee has met that burden, she must impute
              liability for punitive damages to respondent. 
              Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and
              dissenting in part.
              Kolstad American-Dental-Assn. Concur/Dissent
              98-208 42USC1981a(b)(1) Title-VII
              Punitive-damages Rehnquist,C.J.

R086B.pdf     06/22/99     28589 bytes  (13 hits)
              R086B; 6/22/99.  An employer's conduct need not
              be independently "egregious" to satisfy 42 U. S.
              C. §1981a(b)(1)'s requirements for a punitive
              damages award, although evidence of egregious
              misconduct may be used to meet the employee's
              burden of proof; even assuming that petitioner
              employee has met that burden, she must impute
              liability for punitive damages to respondent. 
              Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
              part.
              Kolstad American-Dental-Assn. Concur/Dissent
              98-208 42USC1981a(b)(1) Title-VII
              Punitive-damages Stevens,J.

R086O.pdf     06/22/99     65096 bytes  (20 hits)
              R086-O; 6/22/99.  An employer's conduct need not
              be independently "egregious" to satisfy 42 U. S.
              C. §1981a(b)(1)'s requirements for a punitive
              damages award, although evidence of egregious
              misconduct may be used to meet the employee's
              burden of proof; even assuming that petitioner
              employee has met that burden, she must impute
              liability for punitive damages to respondent. 
              O'Connor, J., opinion.
              Kolstad American-Dental-Assn. Opinion 98-208
              42USC1981a(b)(1) Title-VII Punitive-damages
              O'Connor,J.

R087.pdf      06/22/99     14468 bytes  (47 hits)
              R087; 6/22/99.  Under the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990, an employer requiring
              as a job qualification that an employee meet an
              otherwise applicable federal safety regulation
              does not have to justify enforcing the regulation
              solely because its standard may be waived
              experimentally in an individual case.  Syllabus.
              98-591 Syllabus Albertsons-Inc. Kirkingburg ADA
              Souter,J. Disability Job-qualifications

R087A.pdf     06/22/99     12721 bytes  (16 hits)
              R087A; 6/22/99.  Under the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990, an employer requiring
              as a job qualification that an employee meet an
              otherwise applicable federal safety regulation
              does not have to justify enforcing the regulation
              solely because its standard may be waived
              experimentally in an individual case.  Thomas,
              J., concurring.
              98-591 Concur Albertsons-Inc. Kirkingburg ADA
              Thomas,J. Disability Job-qualifications

R087O.pdf     06/22/99     73033 bytes  (18 hits)
              R087-O; 6/22/99.  Under the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990, an employer requiring
              as a job qualification that an employee meet an
              otherwise applicable federal safety regulation
              does not have to justify enforcing the regulation
              solely because its standard may be waived
              experimentally in an individual case.  Souter,
              J., opinion.
              98-591 Opinion Albertsons-Inc. Kirkingburg ADA
              Souter,J. Disability Job-qualifications

R088.pdf      06/22/99     25943 bytes  (65 hits)
              R088; 6/22/99. Title II of the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990 requires States to place
              mentally disabled persons in community settings
              rather than institutions when the State's
              treatment professionals determine that is
              appropriate, the transfer is not opposed by the
              affected individual, and the placement can be
              reasonably accommodated, given the resources
              available to the State and the needs of others
              with mental disabilities.  Syllabus.
              98-536 Syllabus Olmstead L.C. Ginsburg,J. ADA
              42USC12132 Mental-disabilities

R088A.pdf     06/22/99      8734 bytes  (30 hits)
              R088A; 6/22/99. Title II of the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990 requires States to place
              mentally disabled persons in community settings
              rather than institutions when the State's
              treatment professionals determine that is
              appropriate, the transfer is not opposed by the
              affected individual, and the placement can be
              reasonably accommodated, given the resources
              available to the State and the needs of others
              with mental disabilities.  Stevens, J.,
              concurring in part and concurring in the
              judgment.
              98-536 Concur Olmstead L.C. Stevens,J. ADA
              42USC12132 Mental-disabilities

R088B.pdf     06/22/99     28135 bytes  (31 hits)
              R088B; 6/22/99. Title II of the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990 requires States to place
              mentally disabled persons in community settings
              rather than institutions when the State's
              treatment professionals determine that is
              appropriate, the transfer is not opposed by the
              affected individual, and the placement can be
              reasonably accommodated, given the resources
              available to the State and the needs of others
              with mental disabilities.  Kennedy, J.,
              concurring in the judgment.
              98-536 Concur Olmstead L.C. Kennedy,J. ADA
              42USC12132 Mental-disabilities

R088C.pdf     06/22/99     45254 bytes  (29 hits)
              R088C; 6/22/99. Title II of the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990 requires States to place
              mentally disabled persons in community settings
              rather than institutions when the State's
              treatment professionals determine that is
              appropriate, the transfer is not opposed by the
              affected individual, and the placement can be
              reasonably accommodated, given the resources
              available to the State and the needs of others
              with mental disabilities.  Thomas, J.,
              dissenting.
              98-536 Dissent Olmstead L.C. Thomas,J. ADA
              42USC12132 Mental-disabilities

R088O.pdf     06/22/99     72361 bytes  (23 hits)
              R088-O; 6/22/99. Title II of the Americans with
              Disabilities Act of 1990 requires States to place
              mentally disabled persons in community settings
              rather than institutions when the State's
              treatment professionals determine that is
              appropriate, the transfer is not opposed by the
              affected individual, and the placement can be
              reasonably accommodated, given the resources
              available to the State and the needs of others
              with mental disabilities.  Ginsburg, J., opinion.
              98-536 Opinion Olmstead L.C. Ginsburg,J. ADA
              42USC12132 Mental-disabilities

981509zd.pdf  06/18/99     17194 bytes  (29 hits)
              Columbia Union College v. Edward O. Clark, Jr.,
              Et Al
              The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

R073.pdf      06/18/99     15774 bytes  (20 hits)
              R073; 6/14/99. 18 U. S. C. §1304, which prohibits
              broadcasters from carrying advertising about
              privately operated commercial casino gambling,
              may not be applied to advertisements of lawful
              private casino gambling broadcast by petitioners
              in Louisiana, where such gambling is legal. 
              Syllabus.
              98-387 Syllabus Greater-New-Orleans U. S.
              Stevens,J. 18USC1304 First-Amdt. Casino-gambling

R073A.pdf     06/18/99      9095 bytes  (6 hits)
              R073A; 6/14/99. 18 U. S. C. §1304, which
              prohibits broadcasters from carrying advertising
              about privately operated commercial casino
              gambling, may not be applied to advertisements of
              lawful private casino gambling broadcast by
              petitioners in Louisiana, where such gambling is
              legal.  Rehnquist, C. J., concurring.
              98-387 Concur Greater-New-Orleans U. S.
              Rehnquist,C.J. 18USC1304 First-Amdt.
              Casino-gambling

R073B.pdf     06/18/99      7216 bytes  (7 hits)
              R073B; 6/14/99. 18 U. S. C. §1304, which
              prohibits broadcasters from carrying advertising
              about privately operated commercial casino
              gambling, may not be applied to advertisements of
              lawful private casino gambling broadcast by
              petitioners in Louisiana, where such gambling is
              legal.  Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment.
              98-387 Concur Greater-New-Orleans U. S. Thomas,J.
              18USC1304 First-Amdt. Casino-gambling

R073O.pdf     06/18/99     74248 bytes  (10 hits)
              R073-O; 6/14/99. 18 U. S. C. §1304, which
              prohibits broadcasters from carrying advertising
              about privately operated commercial casino
              gambling, may not be applied to advertisements of
              lawful private casino gambling broadcast by
              petitioners in Louisiana, where such gambling is
              legal.  Stevens, J., opinion.
              98-387 Opinion Greater-New-Orleans U. S.
              Stevens,J. 18USC1304 First-Amdt. Casino-gambling

R074.pdf      06/18/99     11880 bytes  (9 hits)
              R074; 6/14/99.  An order imposing sanctions on an
              attorney pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
              Procedure 37(a)(4) is not a "final decision"
              under 28 U. S. C. §1291, even where the attorney
              no longer represents a party in the case. 
              Syllabus.
              98-727 Syllabus Cunningham Hamilton-County
              Sanctions Thomas,J. 28USC1291 F.R.Civ.P.37(a)(4)

R074A.pdf     06/18/99      9300 bytes  (5 hits)
              R074A; 6/14/99.  An order imposing sanctions on
              an attorney pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
              Procedure 37(a)(4) is not a "final decision"
              under 28 U. S. C. §1291, even where the attorney
              no longer represents a party in the case. 
              Kennedy, J., concurring.
              98-727 Concur Cunningham Hamilton-County
              Sanctions Kennedy,J. 28USC1291 F.R.Civ.P.37(a)(4)

R074O.pdf     06/18/99     41750 bytes  (12 hits)
              R074-O; 6/14/99.  An order imposing sanctions on
              an attorney pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
              Procedure 37(a)(4) is not a "final decision"
              under 28 U. S. C. §1291, even where the attorney
              no longer represents a party in the case. 
              Thomas, J., opinion.
              98-727 Opinion Cunningham Hamilton-County
              Sanctions Thomas,J. 28USC1291 F.R.Civ.P.37(a)(4)

R075.pdf      06/18/99     13098 bytes  (30 hits)
              R075; 6/14/99.  The Equal Employment Opportunity
              Commission possesses the legal authority to
              require federal agencies to pay compensatory
              damages when they discriminate in employment in
              violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
              1964.  Syllabus.
              98-238 Syllabus West Gibson 42USC1981 Breyer,J.
              Compensatory-damages Govt.-employment

R075A.pdf     06/18/99     22539 bytes  (17 hits)
              R075A; 6/14/99.  The Equal Employment Opportunity
              Commission possesses the legal authority to
              require federal agencies to pay compensatory
              damages when they discriminate in employment in
              violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
              1964.  Kennedy, J., dissenting.
              98-238 Dissent West Gibson 42USC1981 Kennedy,J.
              Compensatory-damages Govt.-employment

R075O.pdf     06/18/99     36335 bytes  (22 hits)
              R075-O; 6/14/99.  The Equal Employment
              Opportunity Commission possesses the legal
              authority to require federal agencies to pay
              compensatory damages when they discriminate in
              employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil
              Rights Act of 1964.  Breyer, J., opinion.
              98-238 Opinion West Gibson 42USC1981 Breyer,J.
              Compensatory-damages Govt.-employment

R076.pdf      06/18/99     13566 bytes  (20 hits)
              R076; 6/17/99.  An investigator employed by
              NASA's Inspector General's Office is a
              "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA
              employee, such that the right to union
              representation in the Federal Service
              Labor-Management Relations Statute may be
              invoked.  Syllabus.
              98-369 Syllabus NASA FLRA Federal-employees
              Inspector-General Stevens,J. Labor

R076A.pdf     06/18/99     58230 bytes  (12 hits)
              R076A; 6/17/99.  An investigator employed by
              NASA's Inspector General's Office is a
              "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA
              employee, such that the right to union
              representation in the Federal Service
              Labor-Management Relations Statute may be
              invoked.  Thomas, J., dissenting.
              98-369 Dissent NASA FLRA Federal-employees
              Inspector-General Thomas,J. Labor

R076O.pdf     06/18/99     55148 bytes  (14 hits)
              R076-O; 6/17/99.  An investigator employed by
              NASA's Inspector General's Office is a
              "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA
              employee, such that the right to union
              representation in the Federal Service
              Labor-Management Relations Statute may be
              invoked.  Stevens, J., opinion.
              98-369 Opinion NASA FLRA Federal-employees
              Inspector-General Stevens,J. Labor

R077.pdf      06/18/99     14758 bytes  (22 hits)
              R077; 6/17/99.  Although petitioner has
              demonstrated cause for failing to raise a claim
              under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, Virginia
              did not violate Brady and its progeny by failing
              to disclose exculpatory evidence to petitioner. 
              Syllabus.
              Strickler Greene Syllabus 98-5864 Stevens,J.

R077A.pdf     06/18/99     46119 bytes  (9 hits)
              R077A; 6/17/99.  Although petitioner has
              demonstrated cause for failing to raise a claim
              under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, Virginia
              did not violate Brady and its progeny by failing
              to disclose exculpatory evidence to petitioner. 
              Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
              part.
              Strickler Greene Concur/Dissent 98-5864 Souter,J.

R077O.pdf     06/18/99    109620 bytes  (15 hits)
              R077-O; 6/17/99.  Although petitioner has
              demonstrated cause for failing to raise a claim
              under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, Virginia
              did not violate Brady and its progeny by failing
              to disclose exculpatory evidence to petitioner. 
              Stevens, J., opinion.
              Strickler Greene Opinion 98-5864 Stevens,J.

R078.pdf      06/18/99     12284 bytes  (16 hits)
              R078; 6/17/99.  The Federal District Court had no
              authority to issue a preliminary injunction
              barring petitioners from disposing of their
              assets pending adjudication of respondents'
              contract claim for money damages because such a
              remedy was unavailable from a court of equity. 
              Syllabus.
              98-231 Syllabus Grupo-Mexicano Alliance-Bond-Fund
              Equity-jurisdiction Injunctions Federal-Courts
              Scalia,J.

R078A.pdf     06/18/99     39085 bytes  (7 hits)
              R078A; 6/17/99.  The Federal District Court had
              no authority to issue a preliminary injunction
              barring petitioners from disposing of their
              assets pending adjudication of respondents'
              contract claim for money damages because such a
              remedy was unavailable from a court of equity. 
              Ginsburg, J., dissenting.
              98-231 Dissent Grupo-Mexicano Alliance-Bond-Fund
              Equity-jurisdiction Injunctions Federal-Courts
              Ginsburg,J.

R078O.pdf     06/18/99     79333 bytes  (9 hits)
              R078-O; 6/17/99.  The Federal District Court had
              no authority to issue a preliminary injunction
              barring petitioners from disposing of their
              assets pending adjudication of respondents'
              contract claim for money damages because such a
              remedy was unavailable from a court of equity. 
              Scalia, J., opinion.
              98-231 Opinion Grupo-Mexicano Alliance-Bond-Fund
              Equity-jurisdiction Injunctions Federal-Courts
              Scalia,J.

R069.pdf      06/17/99     16762 bytes  (18 hits)
              R069; 6/10/99.  The harmless-error rule of
              Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, applies to a
              jury instruction that omits an element of an
              offense; materiality is such an element under the
              federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud
              statutes.  Syllabus.
              Neder U. S. Syllabus 97-1985 Harmless-error Fraud
              Rehnquist,C.J. Materiality

R069A.pdf     06/17/99     20385 bytes  (6 hits)
              R069A; 6/10/99.  The harmless-error rule of
              Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, applies to a
              jury instruction that omits an element of an
              offense; materiality is such an element under the
              federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud
              statutes.  Stevens, J., concurring in part and
              concurring in the judgment.
              Neder U. S. Concur 97-1985 Harmless-error Fraud
              Stevens,J. Materiality

R069B.pdf     06/17/99     40952 bytes  (6 hits)
              R069B; 6/10/99.  The harmless-error rule of
              Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, applies to a
              jury instruction that omits an element of an
              offense; materiality is such an element under the
              federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud
              statutes.  Scalia, J., concurring in part and
              dissenting in part.
              Neder U. S. Concur/Dissent 97-1985 Harmless-error
              Fraud Scalia,J. Materiality

R069O.pdf     06/17/99     77394 bytes  (9 hits)
              R069-O; 6/10/99.  The harmless-error rule of
              Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, applies to a
              jury instruction that omits an element of an
              offense; materiality is such an element under the
              federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud
              statutes.  Rehnquist, C. J., opinion.
              Neder U. S. Opinion 97-1985 Harmless-error Fraud
              Rehnquist,C.J. Materiality

R070.pdf      06/17/99     21265 bytes  (55 hits)
              File Description: R070; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang
              Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal
              street gang members" from loitering in public
              places, is unconstitutionally vague.  Syllabus.
              97-1121 Syllabus  Chicago Morales Stevens,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R070A.pdf     06/17/99     20553 bytes  (20 hits)
              R070A; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang Congregation
              Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang
              members" from loitering in public places, is
              unconstitutionally vague.  O'Connor, J.,
              concurring in part and concurring in the
              judgment.
              97-1121 Concur  Chicago Morales O'Connor,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R070B.pdf     06/17/99      8475 bytes  (12 hits)
              R070B; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang Congregation
              Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang
              members" from loitering in public places, is
              unconstitutionally vague.  Kennedy, J.,
              concurring in part and concurring in the
              judgment.
              97-1121 Concur  Chicago Morales Kennedy,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R070C.pdf     06/17/99     16367 bytes  (11 hits)
              R070C; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang Congregation
              Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang
              members" from loitering in public places, is
              unconstitutionally vague.  Breyer, J., concurring
              in part and concurring in the judgment.
              97-1121 Concur Chicago Morales Breyer,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R070D.pdf     06/17/99     97487 bytes  (9 hits)
              R070D; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang Congregation
              Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang
              members" from loitering in public places, is
              unconstitutionally vague.  Scalia, J.,
              dissenting.
              97-1121 Dissent  Chicago Morales Scalia,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R070E.pdf     06/17/99     67937 bytes  (9 hits)
              R070E; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang Congregation
              Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang
              members" from loitering in public places, is
              unconstitutionally vague.  Thomas, J.,
              dissenting.
              97-1121 Dissent  Chicago Morales Thomas,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R070O.pdf     06/17/99     73100 bytes  (10 hits)
              R070-O; 6/10/99. Chicago's Gang Congregation
              Ordinance, which prohibits "criminal street gang
              members" from loitering in public places, is
              unconstitutionally vague.  Stevens, J., opinion.
              97-1121 Opinion  Chicago Morales Stevens,J.
              Gang-congregation Due-process Loitering

R071.pdf      06/17/99     20329 bytes  (18 hits)
              R071; 6/10/99. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause
              rights were violated by the introduction, at his
              criminal trial, of his accomplice's confession,
              which incriminated petitioner for murder; the
              case is remanded for a determination whether that
              error was harmless.  Syllabus.
              98-5881 Syllabus Lilly Virginia
              ConfrontationClause Harmless-error Stevens,J.
              Sixth-Amdt.

R071A.pdf     06/17/99     16104 bytes  (17 hits)
              R071A; 6/10/99. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause
              rights were violated by the introduction, at his
              criminal trial, of his accomplice's confession,
              which incriminated petitioner for murder; the
              case is remanded for a determination whether that
              error was harmless.  Breyer, J., concurring.
              98-5881 Concur Lilly Virginia ConfrontationClause
              Harmless-error Breyer,J. Sixth-Amdt.

R071B.pdf     06/17/99      7139 bytes  (7 hits)
              R071B; 6/10/99. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause
              rights were violated by the introduction, at his
              criminal trial, of his accomplice's confession,
              which incriminated petitioner for murder; the
              case is remanded for a determination whether that
              error was harmless.  Scalia, J., concurring in
              part and concurring in the judgment.
              Lilly Virginia ConfrontationClause Harmless-error
              Scalia,J. Sixth-Amdt. Concur

R071C.pdf     06/17/99      7651 bytes  (5 hits)
              R071C; 6/10/99. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause
              rights were violated by the introduction, at his
              criminal trial, of his accomplice's confession,
              which incriminated petitioner for murder; the
              case is remanded for a determination whether that
              error was harmless.  Thomas, J., concurring in
              part and concurring in the judgment.
              Lilly Virginia ConfrontationClause Harmless-error
              Thomas,J. Sixth-Amdt. Concur

R071D.pdf     06/17/99     25647 bytes  (7 hits)
              R071D; 6/10/99. Petitioner's Confrontation Clause
              rights were violated by the introduction, at his
              criminal trial, of his accomplice's confession,
              which incriminated petitioner for murder; the
              case is remanded for a determination whether that
              error was harmless.  Rehnquist, C. J., concurring
              in the judgment.
              Lilly Virginia ConfrontationClause Harmless-error
              Rehnquist,C.J. Sixth-Amdt. Concur

R071O.pdf     06/17/99     75890 bytes  (7 hits)
              R071-O; 6/10/99. Petitioner's Confrontation
              Clause rights were violated by the introduction,
              at his criminal trial, of his accomplice's
              confession, which incriminated petitioner for
              murder; the case is remanded for a determination
              whether that error was harmless.  Stevens, J.,
              opinion.
              Lilly Virginia ConfrontationClause Harmless-error
              Stevens,J. Sixth-Amdt. Opinion

R072.pdf      06/17/99     11804 bytes  (10 hits)
              R072; 6/10/99.  The Federal Circuit must use the
              Administrative Procedure Act's standard of
              review, see 5 U. S. C. §706, not Federal Rule of
              Civil Procedure 52(a)'s standard, when reviewing
              Patent and Trademark Office factual findings. 
              Syllabus.
              98-377 Syllabus Dickinson Zurko Patents APA
              5USC706 Breyer,J.

R072A.pdf     06/17/99     11898 bytes  (6 hits)
              R072A; 6/10/99.  The Federal Circuit must use the
              Administrative Procedure Act's standard of
              review, see 5 U. S. C. §706, not Federal Rule of
              Civil Procedure 52(a)'s standard, when reviewing
              Patent and Trademark Office factual findings. 
              Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting.
              98-377 Dissent Dickinson Zurko Patents APA
              5USC706 Rehnquist,C.J.

R072O.pdf     06/17/99     66309 bytes  (8 hits)
              R072-O; 6/10/99.  The Federal Circuit must use
              the Administrative Procedure Act's standard of
              review, see 5 U. S. C. §706, not Federal Rule of
              Civil Procedure 52(a)'s standard, when reviewing
              Patent and Trademark Office factual findings. 
              Breyer, J., opinion.
              98-377 Opinion Dickinson Zurko Patents APA
              5USC706 Breyer,J.

R066.pdf      06/04/99     12349 bytes  (20 hits)
              R066; 6/1/99.  A jury in a continuing criminal
              enterprise case under 21 U. S. C. §848 must
              unanimously agree not only that the defendant
              committed some "continuing series of violations,"
              but also about which specific "violations" make
              up that "continuing series."  Syllabus.
              Richardson U. S. Syllabus 97-8629 21USC848
              Breyer,J. CCE Jury-unanimity

R066A.pdf     06/04/99     44196 bytes  (7 hits)
              R066A; 6/1/99.  A jury in a continuing criminal
              enterprise case under 21 U. S. C. §848 must
              unanimously agree not only that the defendant
              committed some "continuing series of violations,"
              but also about which specific "violations" make
              up that "continuing series."  Kennedy, J.,
              dissenting.
              Richardson U. S. Dissent 97-8629 21USC848
              Kennedy,J. CCE Jury-unanimity

R066O.pdf     06/04/99     38797 bytes  (9 hits)
              R066-O; 6/1/99.  A jury in a continuing criminal
              enterprise case under 21 U. S. C. §848 must
              unanimously agree not only that the defendant
              committed some "continuing series of violations,"
              but also about which specific "violations" make
              up that "continuing series."  Breyer, J.,
              opinion.
              Richardson U. S. Opinion 97-8629 21USC848
              Breyer,J. CCE Jury-unanimity

R059.pdf      05/28/99     14797 bytes  (54 hits)
              R059; 5/24/99. A "media ride-along" in a home
              violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the
              state of the law was not clearly established at
              the time the entry of petitioners' home took
              place, respondent officers are entitled to
              qualified immunity.  Syllabus.
              98-83 Syllabus Wilson Layne Rehnquist,C.J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Media-ride-along Immunity

R059A.pdf     05/28/99     36993 bytes  (18 hits)
              R059A; 5/24/99. A "media ride-along" in a home
              violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the
              state of the law was not clearly established at
              the time the entry of petitioners' home took
              place, respondent officers are entitled to
              qualified immunity.  Stevens, J., concurring in
              part and dissenting in part.
              98-83 Concur/Dissent Wilson Layne Stevens,J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Media-ride-along Immunity

R059O.PDF     05/28/99     46709 bytes  (23 hits)
              R059-O; 5/24/99. A "media ride-along" in a home
              violates the Fourth Amendment, but because the
              state of the law was not clearly established at
              the time the entry of petitioners' home took
              place, respondent officers are entitled to
              qualified immunity.  Rehnquist, C. J., opinion.
              98-83 Opinion Wilson Layne Rehnquist,C.J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Media-ride-along Immunity

R060.pdf      05/28/99     66532 bytes  (38 hits)
              R060; 5/24/99.  A private Title IX damages action
              may lie against a school board for
              student-on-student harassment where the board is
              deliberately indifferent to known sexual
              harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and
              objectively offensive that it effectively bars
              the victim's access to educational opportunities
              or benefits.  Syllabus.
              97-843 Syllabus Davis Monroe-Cty.-Bd.-of-Ed.
              Sex-harassment Student-harassment O'Connor,J.
              Title-IX

R060A.pdf     05/28/99    107897 bytes  (17 hits)
              R060A; 5/24/99.  A private Title IX damages
              action may lie against a school board for
              student-on-student harassment where the board is
              deliberately indifferent to known sexual
              harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and
              objectively offensive that it effectively bars
              the victim's access to educational opportunities
              or benefits.  Kennedy, J., dissenting.
              97-843 Dissent Davis Monroe-Cty.-Bd.-of-Ed.
              Sex-harassment Student-harassment Kennedy,J.
              Title-IX

R060O.pdf     05/28/99     77106 bytes  (17 hits)
              R060-O; 5/24/99.  A private Title IX damages
              action may lie against a school board for
              student-on-student harassment where the board is
              deliberately indifferent to known sexual
              harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and
              objectively offensive that it effectively bars
              the victim's access to educational opportunities
              or benefits.  O'Connor, J., opinion.
              97-843 Opinion Davis Monroe-Cty.-Bd.-of-Ed.
              Sex-harassment Student-harassment O'Connor,J.
              Title-IX

R061.pdf      05/28/99     27307 bytes  (23 hits)
              R061; 5/24/99. The District Court properly
              submitted the question of liability on
              respondents' sec. 1983 regulatory takings claim
              to the jury.  Syllabus.
              97-1235 Syllabus Monterey Del-Monte-Dunes
              Kennedy,J. Takings-Clause Regulatory-taking
              42USC1983

R061A.pdf     05/28/99     41344 bytes  (11 hits)
              R061A; 5/24/99. The District Court properly
              submitted the question of liability on
              respondents' sec. 1983 regulatory takings claim
              to the jury.  Scalia, J., concurring in part and
              concurring in the judgment.
              97-1235 Concur Monterey Del-Monte-Dunes Scalia,J.
              Takings-Clause Regulatory-taking 42USC1983

R061B.pdf     05/28/99     88126 bytes  (9 hits)
              R061B; 5/24/99. The District Court properly
              submitted the question of liability on
              respondents' sec. 1983 regulatory takings claim
              to the jury.  Souter, J., concurring in part and
              dissenting in part.
              97-1235 Concur/Dissent Monterey Del-Monte-Dunes
              Souter,J. Takings-Clause Regulatory-taking
              42USC1983

R061O.pdf     05/28/99     99671 bytes  (10 hits)
              R061-O; 5/24/99. The District Court properly
              submitted the question of liability on
              respondents' sec. 1983 regulatory takings claim
              to the jury.  Kennedy, J., opinion.
              97-1235 Opinion Monterey Del-Monte-Dunes
              Kennedy,J. Takings-Clause Regulatory-taking
              42USC1983

R062.pdf      05/28/99     14626 bytes  (11 hits)
              R062; 5/24/99.  The FTC's jurisdiction extends to
              an association that provides substantial economic
              benefit to its for-profit members; because the
              anticompetitive effects of petitioner's
              advertising restrictions were not intuitively
              obvious, the Ninth Circuit erred in using an
              abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis to determine
              whether the restrictions violated antitrust laws.
                Syllabus.
              97-1625 Syllabus FTC California-Dental-Assn.
              Antitrust Rule-of-reason Jurisdiction Souter,J.

R062A.pdf     05/28/99     48094 bytes  (5 hits)
              R062A; 5/24/99.  The FTC's jurisdiction extends
              to an association that provides substantial
              economic benefit to its for-profit members;
              because the anticompetitive effects of
              petitioner's advertising restrictions were not
              intuitively obvious, the Ninth Circuit erred in
              using an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis to
              determine whether the restrictions violated
              antitrust laws.  Breyer, J., concurring in part
              and dissenting in part.
              97-1625 Concur/Dissent FTC California-Dental-Assn
              . Antitrust Rule-of-reason Jurisdiction Breyer,J.

R062O.pdf     05/28/99     80399 bytes  (4 hits)
              R062-O; 5/24/99.  The FTC's jurisdiction extends
              to an association that provides substantial
              economic benefit to its for-profit members;
              because the anticompetitive effects of
              petitioner's advertising restrictions were not
              intuitively obvious, the Ninth Circuit erred in
              using an abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis to
              determine whether the restrictions violated
              antitrust laws.  Souter, J., opinion.
              97-1625 Opinion FTC California-Dental-Assn.
              Antitrust Rule-of-reason Jurisdiction Souter,J.

R063.pdf      05/28/99     12557 bytes  (25 hits)
              R063; 5/24/99.  Pursuit, and receipt, of Social
              Security disability benefits does not estop a
              recipient from pursuing an Americans with
              Disability Act claim or set up a strong
              presumption against ADA success, but the
              recipient must explain why her Social Security
              claim that she is unable to work is consistent
              with her ADA claim that she can perform her job's
              essential functions.  Syllabus.
              Cleveland Policy-Mangement-Systems Syllabus
              97-1008 Breyer,J. ADA Disability Social-Security

R063O.pdf     05/28/99     39792 bytes  (20 hits)
              R063-O; 5/24/99.  Pursuit, and receipt, of Social
              Security disability benefits does not estop a
              recipient from pursuing an Americans with
              Disability Act claim or set up a strong
              presumption against ADA success, but the
              recipient must explain why her Social Security
              claim that she is unable to work is consistent
              with her ADA claim that she can perform her job's
              essential functions.  Breyer, J., opinion.
              Cleveland Policy-Mangement-Systems Opinion
              97-1008 Breyer,J. ADA Disability Social-Security

R064.pdf      05/28/99     10213 bytes  (23 hits)
              R064; 5/24/99.  Because respondent homeowners
              allege a Fourth Amendment violation under today's
              decision in Wilson v. Layne, but petitioner
              officers are entitled to a qualified immunity
              defense, the Ninth Circuit's judgment for
              respondents is vacated.  Per Curiam.
              97-1927 PerCuriam Hanlon Berger Media-ride-along
              Immunity Fourth-Amdt. Wilson-v.-Layne

R064A.pdf     05/28/99      6656 bytes  (9 hits)
              R064A; 5/24/99.  Because respondent homeowners
              allege a Fourth Amendment violation under today's
              decision in Wilson v. Layne, but petitioner
              officers are entitled to a qualified immunity
              defense, the Ninth Circuit's judgment for
              respondents is vacated.  Stevens, J., concurring
              in part and dissenting in part.
              97-1927 Concur/Dissent Hanlon Berger
              Media-ride-along Immunity Fourth-Amdt. Stevens,J.

R065.pdf      05/28/99      9891 bytes  (7 hits)
              R065; 5/24/99.  Abusive filer is denied leave to
              proceed in forma pauperis on all future
              certiorari petitions in noncriminal cases.  Per
              Curiam.
              PerCuriam 98-8486 98-8487 Cross
              Pelican-Bay-State-Prison IFP Abusive-filings
              Frivolous

R053.pdf      05/25/99     14173 bytes  (22 hits)
              R053; 5/17/99.  California's durational residency
              requirement-which limits new residents to the
              welfare benefit level paid in the State of their
              former residence-violates the right to travel
              guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; its
              constitutionality is not resuscitated by a change
              in federal welfare law.  Syllabus.
              98-97 Syllabus Saenz Roe Stevens,J.
              Right-to-travel Welfare California

R053A.pdf     05/25/99     38561 bytes  (9 hits)
              R053A; 5/17/99.  California's durational
              residency requirement-which limits new residents
              to the welfare benefit level paid in the State of
              their former residence-violates the right to
              travel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment;
              its constitutionality is not resuscitated by a
              change in federal welfare law.  Rehnquist, C. J.,
              dissenting.
              98-97 Dissent Saenz Roe Rehnquist,C.J.
              Right-to-travel Welfare California

R053B.pdf     05/25/99     30058 bytes  (12 hits)
              R053B; 5/17/99.  California's durational
              residency requirement-which limits new residents
              to the welfare benefit level paid in the State of
              their former residence-violates the right to
              travel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment;
              its constitutionality is not resuscitated by a
              change in federal welfare law.  Thomas, J.,
              dissenting.
              98-97 Dissent Saenz Roe Thomas,J. Right-to-travel
              Welfare California

R053O.pdf     05/25/99     67705 bytes  (9 hits)
              R053-O; 5/17/99.  California's durational
              residency requirement-which limits new residents
              to the welfare benefit level paid in the State of
              their former residence-violates the right to
              travel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment;
              its constitutionality is not resuscitated by a
              change in federal welfare law.  Stevens, J.,
              opinion.
              98-97 Opinion Saenz Roe Stevens,J.
              Right-to-travel Welfare California

R054.pdf      05/25/99     13647 bytes  (8 hits)
              R054; 5/17/99. Because the Court of Appeals Armed
              Forces' process was neither "in aid of" its
              strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review
              court-martials under 10 U. S. C. §867 nor
              "necessary" or "appropriate" in light of a
              servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek
              relief, it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin dropping
              respondent from the Air Force rolls.  Syllabus.
              98-347 Syllabus Clinton Goldsmith 10USC867
              Souter,J. Ct.App.ArmedForces All-Writs-Act

R054O.pdf     05/25/99     38021 bytes  (3 hits)
              R054-O; 5/17/99. Because the Court of Appeals
              Armed Forces' process was neither "in aid of" its
              strictly circumscribed jurisdiction to review
              court-martials under 10 U. S. C. §867 nor
              "necessary" or "appropriate" in light of a
              servicemember's alternative opportunities to seek
              relief, it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin dropping
              respondent from the Air Force rolls.  Souter, J.,
              opinion.
              98-347 Opinion Clinton Goldsmith 10USC867
              Souter,J. Ct.App.ArmedForces All-Writs-Act

R055.pdf      05/25/99     11824 bytes  (4 hits)
              R055; 5/17/99.  Because the North Carolina
              General Assembly's motivation in drawing the
              State's Twelfth Congressional District was in
              dispute, appellees were not entitled to summary
              judgment on their claim that the district was a
              racial gerrymander that violated equal
              protection.  Syllabus.
              98-85 Syllabus Hunt Cromartie Thomas,J.
              North-Carolina Redistricting Equal-protection

R055A.pdf     05/25/99     19588 bytes  (4 hits)
              R055A; 5/17/99.  Because the North Carolina
              General Assembly's motivation in drawing the
              State's Twelfth Congressional District was in
              dispute, appellees were not entitled to summary
              judgment on their claim that the district was a
              racial gerrymander that violated equal
              protection.  Stevens, J., concurring in the
              judgment.
              98-85 Concur Hunt Cromartie Stevens,J.
              North-Carolina Redistricting Equal-protection

R055O.pdf     05/25/99     45184 bytes  (5 hits)
              R055-O; 5/17/99.  Because the North Carolina
              General Assembly's motivation in drawing the
              State's Twelfth Congressional District was in
              dispute, appellees were not entitled to summary
              judgment on their claim that the district was a
              racial gerrymander that violated equal
              protection.  Thomas, J., opinion.
              98-85 Opinion Hunt Cromartie Thomas,J.
              North-Carolina Redistricting Equal-protection

R056.pdf      05/25/99     10699 bytes  (29 hits)
              R056; 5/17/99.  The Fourth Amendment does not
              require the police to obtain a warrant before
              seizing an automobile from a public place when
              they have probable cause to believe that it is
              forfeitable contraband.  Syllabus.
              98-223 Syllabus Florida White Fourth-Amdt.
              Thomas,J. Seizures Criminal-law

R056A.pdf     05/25/99      8215 bytes  (11 hits)
              R056A; 5/17/99.  The Fourth Amendment does not
              require the police to obtain a warrant before
              seizing an automobile from a public place when
              they have probable cause to believe that it is
              forfeitable contraband.  Souter, J., concurring.
              98-223 Concur Florida White Fourth-Amdt.
              Souter,J. Seizures Criminal-law

R056B.pdf     05/25/99     28632 bytes  (14 hits)
              R056B; 5/17/99.  The Fourth Amendment does not
              require the police to obtain a warrant before
              seizing an automobile from a public place when
              they have probable cause to believe that it is
              forfeitable contraband.  Stevens, J., dissenting.
              98-223 Dissent Florida White Fourth-Amdt.
              Stevens,J. Seizures Criminal-law

R056O.pdf     05/25/99     24882 bytes  (17 hits)
              R056-O; 5/17/99.  The Fourth Amendment does not
              require the police to obtain a warrant before
              seizing an automobile from a public place when
              they have probable cause to believe that it is
              forfeitable contraband.  Thomas, J., opinion.
              98-223 Opinion Florida White Fourth-Amdt.
              Thomas,J. Seizures Criminal-law

R057.pdf      05/25/99     15300 bytes  (10 hits)
              R057; 5/17/99.  In cases removed from state court
              to federal court, as in cases originating in
              federal court, there is no unyielding
              jurisdictional hierarchy requiring the federal
              court to adjudicate subject-matter jurisdiction
              before considering a challenge to personal
              jurisdiction.  Syllabus.
              98-470 Syllabus Ruhrgas-AG Marathon-Oil-Co.
              Ginsburg,J. Jurisdiction Removal Steel-Co.

R057O.pdf     05/25/99     45970 bytes  (8 hits)
              R057-O; 5/17/99.  In cases removed from state
              court to federal court, as in cases originating
              in federal court, there is no unyielding
              jurisdictional hierarchy requiring the federal
              court to adjudicate subject-matter jurisdiction
              before considering a challenge to personal
              jurisdiction.  Ginsburg, J., opinion.
              98-470 Opinion Ruhrgas-AG Marathon-Oil-Co.
              Ginsburg,J. Jurisdiction Removal Steel-Co.

R058.pdf      05/25/99     35171 bytes  (20 hits)
              R058; 5/17/99.  New Jersey is granted sovereignty
              over unfilled portions of Ellis Island added by
              the Federal Government after 1834, New York
              remains sovereign under the Compact of 1834 over
              the original Ellis Island, and the two States'
              sovereign boundaries are set forth.  Decree.
              120Orig. New-York New-Jersey Boundaries
              Ellis-Island Decree

R050.pdf      05/07/99     15176 bytes  (31 hits)
              R050; 5/3/99.  In requiring the Board of
              Immigration Appeals to supplement its weighing
              test for determining an alien's entitlement to
              withholding of deportation, the Ninth Circuit
              failed to accord Chevron deference to the BIA's
              interpretation of 8 U. S. C. 1253(h)(2)(C).   
              Syllabus.
              INS Aguirre-Aguirre Syllabus 97-1754
              Chevron-analysis Kennedy,J. Immigration
              8USC1253(h)(2)(C)

R050O.pdf     05/07/99     54203 bytes  (12 hits)
              R050-O; 5/3/99.  In requiring the Board of
              Immigration Appeals to supplement its weighing
              test for determining an alien's entitlement to
              withholding of deportation, the Ninth Circuit
              failed to accord Chevron deference to the BIA's
              interpretation of 8 U. S. C. 1253(h)(2)(C). 
              Kennedy, J., opinion.
              INS Aguirre-Aguirre Opinion 97-1754
              Chevron-analysis Kennedy,J. Immigration
              8USC1253(h)(2)(C)

R051.pdf      05/07/99     15725 bytes  (16 hits)
              R051; 5/3/99.  11 U. S. C. 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
              disqualifies a debtor's prebankruptcy equity
              holders, over the objection of a senior class of
              impaired creditors, from contributing new capital
              and receiving ownership interests in the
              reorganized entity, when that opportunity is
              given exclusively to such holders under a plan
              adopted without consideration of alternatives. 
              Syllabus.
              97-1418 Syllabus Bank-of-America
              203-North-LaSalle-St. Souter,J. Bankruptcy
              11USC1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) New-value

R051A.pdf     05/07/99     24103 bytes  (11 hits)
              R051A; 5/3/99.  11 U. S. C. 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
              disqualifies a debtor's prebankruptcy equity
              holders, over the objection of a senior class of
              impaired creditors, from contributing new capital
              and receiving ownership interests in the
              reorganized entity, when that opportunity is
              given exclusively to such holders under a plan
              adopted without consideration of alternatives. 
              Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment.
              97-1418 COncur Bank-of-America 203-North-LaSalle-
              St. Thomas,J. Bankruptcy 11USC1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
              New-value

R051B.pdf     05/07/99     33272 bytes  (5 hits)
              R051B; 5/3/99.  11 U. S. C. 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
              disqualifies a debtor's prebankruptcy equity
              holders, over the objection of a senior class of
              impaired creditors, from contributing new capital
              and receiving ownership interests in the
              reorganized entity, when that opportunity is
              given exclusively to such holders under a plan
              adopted without consideration of alternatives. 
              Stevens, J., dissenting.
              97-1418 Dissent Bank-of-America
              203-North-LaSalle-St. Stevens,J. Bankruptcy
              11USC1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) New-value

R051O.pdf     05/07/99     79469 bytes  (8 hits)
              R051-O; 5/3/99.  11 U. S. C. 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)
              disqualifies a debtor's prebankruptcy equity
              holders, over the objection of a senior class of
              impaired creditors, from contributing new capital
              and receiving ownership interests in the
              reorganized entity, when that opportunity is
              given exclusively to such holders under a plan
              adopted without consideration of alternatives. 
              Souter, J., opinion.
              97-1418 Opinion Bank-of-America
              203-North-LaSalle-St. Souter,J. Bankruptcy
              11USC1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) New-value

R052.pdf      05/07/99     13757 bytes  (8 hits)
              R052; 5/3/99.  Because respondents did not
              cross-appeal the District Court's partial
              injunctions against them, the Ninth Circuit erred
              in addressing them sua sponte; the tribal court
              exhaustion doctrine does not extend to
              Price-Anderson Act claims.  Syllabus.
              El-Paso-Natural-Gas-Co. Neztsosie Syllabus 98-6
              Souter,J. Price-Anderson-Act Tribal-exhaustion
              Cross-appeals

R052O.pdf     05/07/99     46748 bytes  (3 hits)
              R052-O; 5/3/99.  Because respondents did not
              cross-appeal the District Court's partial
              injunctions against them, the Ninth Circuit erred
              in addressing them sua sponte; the tribal court
              exhaustion doctrine does not extend to
              Price-Anderson Act claims.  Souter, J., opinion.
              El-Paso-Natural-Gas-Co. Neztsosie Opinion 98-6
              Souter,J. Price-Anderson-Act Tribal-exhaustion
              Cross-appeals

R049.pdf      05/03/99     13070 bytes  (20 hits)
              R049; 4/27/99. In order to establish an illegal
              gratuity in violation of 18 U. S. C.
              §201(c)(1)(A), the Government must prove a link
              between a thing of value conferred upon a federal
              official and a specific "official act" for or
              because of which it was given.  Syllabus.
              U. S. Sun-Diamond-Growers Syllabus 98-131
              18USC201(c)(1)(A) Illegal-gratuity Scalia,J.
              Criminal-law

R047.pdf      04/23/99     19707 bytes  (25 hits)
              R047; 4/20/99. California's "notice-prejudice"
              rule is a "law . . . which regulates insurance"
              that is saved from pre-emption by ERISA; but the
              State's rule deeming an employer administering a
              health plan the insurer's agent "relate[s] to"
              ERISA plans and does not escape pre-emption. 
              Syllabus. 
              UNUM-Life-Ins.-Co.

R047O.pdf     04/23/99     62820 bytes  (5 hits)
              R047-O; 4/20/99. California's "notice-prejudice"
              rule is a "law . . . which regulates insurance"
              that is saved from pre-emption by ERISA; but the
              State's rule deeming an employer administering a
              health plan the insurer's agent "relate[s] to"
              ERISA plans and does not escape pre-emption. 
              Ginsburg, J., opinion.
              UNUM-Life-Ins.-Co.

R048.pdf      04/23/99     16266 bytes  (15 hits)
              R048; 4/21/99.  A customs classification
              regulation is subject to Chevron analysis; if the
              regulation is a reasonable interpretation and
              implementation of an ambiguous statutory
              provision, it must be given judicial deference. 
              Syllabus.
              97-2044 Syllabus U. S. Haggar-Apparel-Co. Customs
              Kennedy,J. Chevron-analysis Deference

R048A.pdf     04/23/99     11725 bytes  (12 hits)
              R048A; 4/21/99.  A customs classification
              regulation is subject to Chevron analysis; if the
              regulation is a reasonable interpretation and
              implementation of an ambiguous statutory
              provision, it must be given judicial deference. 
              Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
              part.
              97-2044 Concur/Dissent U. S. Haggar-Apparel-Co.
              Customs Stevens,J. Chevron-analysis Deference

R048O.pdf     04/23/99     43661 bytes  (15 hits)
              R048-O; 4/21/99.  A customs classification
              regulation is subject to Chevron analysis; if the
              regulation is a reasonable interpretation and
              implementation of an ambiguous statutory
              provision, it must be given judicial deference. 
              Kennedy, J., opinion.
              97-2044 Opinion U. S. Haggar-Apparel-Co. Customs
              Kennedy,J. Chevron-analysis Deference

R043.pdf      04/08/99     11359 bytes  (32 hits)
              R043; 4/5/99. A prosecutor does not violate an
              attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice
              his profession by executing a warrant to search
              the attorney while his client is testifying
              before a grand jury.  Syllabus.
              Conn Gabbert Syllabus 97-1802 Fourteenth-Amdt.
              Rehnquist,C.J. Attorneys Search-warrant

R043A.pdf     04/08/99      2515 bytes  (12 hits)
              R043A; 4/5/99. A prosecutor does not violate an
              attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice
              his profession by executing a warrant to search
              the attorney while his client is testifying
              before a grand jury.  Stevens, J., concurring in
              the judgment.
              Conn Gabbert Concur 97-1802 Fourteenth-Amdt.
              Stevens,J. Attorneys Search-warrant

R043O.pdf     04/08/99     25927 bytes  (27 hits)
              R043-O; 4/5/99. A prosecutor does not violate an
              attorney's Fourteenth Amendment right to practice
              his profession by executing a warrant to search
              the attorney while his client is testifying
              before a grand jury.  Rehnquist, C. J., opinion.
              Conn Gabbert Opinion 97-1802 Fourteenth-Amdt.
              Rehnquist,C.J. Attorneys Search-warrant

R044.pdf      04/08/99     12659 bytes  (39 hits)
              R044; 4/5/99.  The Fourth and Fourteenth
              Amendments permit police officers with probable
              cause to search a car to inspect passengers'
              belonging found in the car that are capable of
              concealing the object of the search.  Syllabus.
              98-184 Syllabus Wyoming Houghton Scalia,J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Fourteenth-Amdt. Search

R044A.pdf     04/08/99     21630 bytes  (19 hits)
              R044A; 4/5/99.  The Fourth and Fourteenth
              Amendments permit police officers with probable
              cause to search a car to inspect passengers'
              belonging found in the car that are capable of
              concealing the object of the search.  Breyer, J.,
              concurring.
              98-184 Concur Wyoming Houghton Breyer,J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Fourteenth-Amdt. Search

R044B.pdf     04/08/99     23017 bytes  (17 hits)
              R044B; 4/5/99.  The Fourth and Fourteenth
              Amendments permit police officers with probable
              cause to search a car to inspect passengers'
              belonging found in the car that are capable of
              concealing the object of the search.  Stevens,
              J., dissenting.
              98-184 Dissent Wyoming Houghton Stevens,J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Fourteenth-Amdt. Search

R044O.pdf     04/08/99     37923 bytes  (20 hits)
              R044-O; 4/5/99.  The Fourth and Fourteenth
              Amendments permit police officers with probable
              cause to search a car to inspect passengers'
              belonging found in the car that are capable of
              concealing the object of the search.  Scalia, J.,
              opinion.
              98-184 Opinion Wyoming Houghton Scalia,J.
              Fourth-Amdt. Fourteenth-Amdt. Search

R045.pdf      04/08/99     15046 bytes  (23 hits)
              R045; 4/5/99.  A guilty plea does not waive the
              Fifth Amendment privilege against
              self-incrimination in the case's sentencing
              phase; nor may a court draw an adverse inference
              from the defendant's silence in determining facts
              about the crime that bear on the severity of the
              sentence.  Syllabus. 
              97-7541 Syllabus Mitchell U. S. Fifth-Amdt.
              Self-incrimination Kennedy,J. Sentencing

R045A.pdf     04/08/99     42187 bytes  (7 hits)
              R045A; 4/5/99.  A guilty plea does not waive the
              Fifth Amendment privilege against
              self-incrimination in the case's sentencing
              phase; nor may a court draw an adverse inference
              from the defendant's silence in determining facts
              about the crime that bear on the severity of the
              sentence.  Scalia, J., dissenting.
              97-7541 Dissent Mitchell U. S. Fifth-Amdt.
              Self-incrimination Scalia,J. Sentencing

R045B.pdf     04/08/99     14012 bytes  (5 hits)
              R045B; 4/5/99.  A guilty plea does not waive the
              Fifth Amendment privilege against
              self-incrimination in the case's sentencing
              phase; nor may a court draw an adverse inference
              from the defendant's silence in determining facts
              about the crime that bear on the severity of the
              sentence.  Thomas, J., dissenting.
              97-7541 Dissent Mitchell U. S. Fifth-Amdt.
              Self-incrimination Thomas,J. Sentencing

R045O.pdf     04/08/99     49479 bytes  (8 hits)
              R045-O; 4/5/99.  A guilty plea does not waive the
              Fifth Amendment privilege against
              self-incrimination in the case's sentencing
              phase; nor may a court draw an adverse inference
              from the defendant's silence in determining facts
              about the crime that bear on the severity of the
              sentence.  Kennedy, J., opinion.
              97-7541 Opinion Mitchell U. S. Fifth-Amdt.
              Self-incrimination Kennedy,J. Sentencing

R046.pdf      04/08/99     17490 bytes  (13 hits)
              R046; 4/5/99.  Under 28 U. S. C. §1446(b), a
              named defendant's time to remove a case from
              state to federal court is triggered by
              simultaneous service of the summons and
              complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through
              service or otherwise," after and apart from
              service of the summons, but not by mere receipt
              of the complaint unattended by any formal
              service.  Syllabus.
              Murphy-Brothers-Inc. Michetti-Pipe-Stringing
              Syllabus 97-1909 28USC1446(b) Ginsburg,J. Removal

R046A.pdf     04/08/99      7315 bytes  (6 hits)
              R046A; 4/5/99.  Under 28 U. S. C. §1446(b), a
              named defendant's time to remove a case from
              state to federal court is triggered by
              simultaneous service of the summons and
              complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through
              service or otherwise," after and apart from
              service of the summons, but not by mere receipt
              of the complaint unattended by any formal
              service.  Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting.
              Murphy-Brothers-Inc. Michetti-Pipe-Stringing
              Dissent 97-1909 28USC1446(b) Rehnquist,C.J.
              Removal

R046O.pdf     04/08/99     36790 bytes  (14 hits)
              R046-O; 4/5/99.  Under 28 U. S. C. §1446(b), a
              named defendant's time to remove a case from
              state to federal court is triggered by
              simultaneous service of the summons and
              complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through
              service or otherwise," after and apart from
              service of the summons, but not by mere receipt
              of the complaint unattended by any formal
              service.  Ginsburg, J., opinion.
              Murphy-Brothers-Inc. Michetti-Pipe-Stringing
              Opinion 97-1909 28USC1446(b) Kennedy,J. Removal

98966zd.pdf   04/01/99     11513 bytes  (24 hits)
              City of Dallas Et Al. v. Dallas Fire Fighters
              Association Et Al.
              On petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
              States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
              No. 98-966. Decided March 29, 1999.

R032.pdf      04/01/99     14705 bytes  (24 hits)
              R032; 3/3/99.  The Court declines to exercise its
              original jurisdiction to allow Germany to
              challenge Arizona's scheduled execution of a
              German citizen, given the tardiness of Germany's
              pleas and the jurisdictional barriers they
              implicate.  Per Curiam.
              127Orig.

R035.pdf      04/01/99     18237 bytes  (11 hits)
              R035; 3/22/99. The Ohio Supreme Court's
              invalidation of a state law exempting public
              universities' standards for professors'
              instructional workloads from collective
              bargaining cannot be reconciled with Equal
              Protection Clause requirements.  Per Curiam.
              98-1071

R035A.pdf     04/01/99      8267 bytes  (7 hits)
              R035A; 3/22/99. The Ohio Supreme Court's
              invalidation of a state law exempting public
              universities' standards for professors'
              instructional workloads from collective
              bargaining cannot be reconciled with Equal
              Protection Clause requirements.  Ginsburg, J.,
              concurring.
              98-1071

R035B.pdf     04/01/99     19200 bytes  (3 hits)
              R035B; 3/22/99. The Ohio Supreme Court's
              invalidation of a state law exempting public
              universities' standards for professors'
              instructional workloads from collective
              bargaining cannot be reconciled with Equal
              Protection Clause requirements.  Stevens, J.,
              dissenting.
              98-1071

R036.pdf      04/01/99      9232 bytes  (19 hits)
              R036; 3/22/99.  Abusive filer of frivolous
              petitions is denied in forma pauperis status on
              this and future petitions for certiorari or
              extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters.  Per
              Curiam.
              98-7450

R037.pdf      04/01/99     18643 bytes  (26 hits)
              R037; 3/23/99.  The reliability rules set forth
              in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
              509 U. S. 579, may apply to the testimony of
              engineers and other nonscientists who are expert
              witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
              Syllabus.
              97-1709

R037A.pdf     04/01/99      7113 bytes  (10 hits)
              R037A; 3/23/99.  The reliability rules set forth
              in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
              509 U. S. 579, may apply to the testimony of
              engineers and other nonscientists who are expert
              witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
              Scalia, J., concurring.
              97-1709

R037B.pdf     04/01/99      7823 bytes  (6 hits)
              R037B; 3/23/99.  The reliability rules set forth
              in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
              509 U. S. 579, may apply to the testimony of
              engineers and other nonscientists who are expert
              witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
              Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
              part.
              97-1709

R037O.pdf     04/01/99     73473 bytes  (13 hits)
              R037-O; 3/23/99.  The reliability rules set forth
              in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
              509 U. S. 579, may apply to the testimony of
              engineers and other nonscientists who are expert
              witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
              Breyer, J., opinion.
              97-1709

R038.pdf      04/01/99     12268 bytes  (5 hits)
              R038; 3/23/99. The Alabama Supreme Court's
              refusal to permit petitioners to raise their
              constitutional claims because of res judicata or
              collateral estoppel is inconsistent with the
              Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee; the
              state franchise tax on foreign corporations
              discriminates against interstate commerce, in
              violation of the Commerce Clause.  Syllabus.
              97-2045

R038A.pdf     04/01/99      6560 bytes  (5 hits)
              R038A; 3/23/99. The Alabama Supreme Court's
              refusal to permit petitioners to raise their
              constitutional claims because of res judicata or
              collateral estoppel is inconsistent with the
              Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee; the
              state franchise tax on foreign corporations
              discriminates against interstate commerce, in
              violation of the Commerce Clause.  O'Connor, J.,
              concurring.
              97-2045

R038B.pdf     04/01/99      6465 bytes  (3 hits)
              R038B; 3/23/99. The Alabama Supreme Court's
              refusal to permit petitioners to raise their
              constitutional claims because of res judicata or
              collateral estoppel is inconsistent with the
              Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee; the
              state franchise tax on foreign corporations
              discriminates against interstate commerce, in
              violation of the Commerce Clause.  Thomas, J.,
              concurring.
              97-2045

R038O.pdf     04/01/99     35451 bytes  (5 hits)
              R038-O; 3/23/99. The Alabama Supreme Court's
              refusal to permit petitioners to raise their
              constitutional claims because of res judicata or
              collateral estoppel is inconsistent with the
              Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee; the
              state franchise tax on foreign corporations
              discriminates against interstate commerce, in
              violation of the Commerce Clause.  Breyer, J.,
              opinion.
              97-2045

R039.pdf      04/01/99     19299 bytes  (23 hits)
              R039; 3/24/99.  The Chippewa Indians retain
              hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on land in
              present-day Minnesota that they ceded to the
              United States in an 1837 Treaty.  Syllabus.
              97-1337

R039A.pdf     04/01/99     44270 bytes  (12 hits)
              R039A; 3/24/99.  The Chippewa Indians retain
              hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on land in
              present-day Minnesota that they ceded to the
              United States in an 1837 Treaty.  Rehnquist, C.
              J., dissenting.
              97-1337

R039B.pdf     04/01/99     26767 bytes  (4 hits)
              R039B; 3/24/99.  The Chippewa Indians retain
              hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on land in
              present-day Minnesota that they ceded to the
              United States in an 1837 Treaty.  Thomas, J.,
              dissenting.
              97-1337

R039O.pdf     04/01/99    109228 bytes  (8 hits)
              R039-O; 3/24/99.  The Chippewa Indians retain
              hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on land in
              present-day Minnesota that they ceded to the
              United States in an 1837 Treaty.  O'Connor, J.,
              opinion.
              97-1337

R040.pdf      04/01/99     14242 bytes  (10 hits)
              R040; 3/24/99.  The federal carjacking statute,
              18 U. S. C. §2119, establishes not a single crime
              with a choice of three maximum penalties but
              three distinct offenses, each of which must be
              charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable
              doubt, and submitted to a jury for verdict. 
              Syllabus.
              97-6203

R040A.pdf     04/01/99      9180 bytes  (6 hits)
              R040A; 3/24/99.  The federal carjacking statute,
              18 U. S. C. §2119, establishes not a single crime
              with a choice of three maximum penalties but
              three distinct offenses, each of which must be
              charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable
              doubt, and submitted to a jury for verdict. 
              Stevens, J., concurring.
              97-6203

R040B.pdf     04/01/99      6756 bytes  (6 hits)
              R040B; 3/24/99.  The federal carjacking statute,
              18 U. S. C. §2119, establishes not a single crime
              with a choice of three maximum penalties but
              three distinct offenses, each of which must be
              charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable
              doubt, and submitted to a jury for verdict. 
              Scalia, J., concurring.
              97-6203

R040C.pdf     04/01/99    103338 bytes  (6 hits)
              R040C; 3/24/99.  The federal carjacking statute,
              18 U. S. C. §2119, establishes not a single crime
              with a choice of three maximum penalties but
              three distinct offenses, each of which must be
              charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable
              doubt, and submitted to a jury for verdict. 
              Kennedy, J., dissenting.
              97-6203

R040O.pdf     04/01/99    122122 bytes  (8 hits)
              R040-O; 3/24/99.  The federal carjacking statute,
              18 U. S. C. §2119, establishes not a single crime
              with a choice of three maximum penalties but
              three distinct offenses, each of which must be
              charged by indictment, proved beyond a reasonable
              doubt, and submitted to a jury for verdict. 
              Souter, J., opinion.
              97-6203

R041.pdf      04/01/99      9579 bytes  (7 hits)
              R041; 3/29/99.  Abusive filer of frivolous
              petitions is denied in forma pauperis status on
              these and future petitions for certiorari or
              extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters.  Per
              Curiam.
              98-7591 PerCuriam Lowe Pogue Abusive-filings IFP
              Frivolous Rule39.8

R042.pdf      04/01/99     10909 bytes  (9 hits)
              R042; 3/30/99.  Venue in a prosecution for using
              or carrying a firearm during and in relation to
              any crime of violence is proper in any district
              where the crime of violence was committed. 
              Syllabus.
              97-1139 Syllabus U. S. Rodriguez-Moreno Venue
              Thomas,J. Criminal-law 18USC924(c)(1)

R042A.pdf     04/01/99     16480 bytes  (7 hits)
              R042A; 3/30/99.  Venue in a prosecution for using
              or carrying a firearm during and in relation to
              any crime of violence is proper in any district
              where the crime of violence was committed. 
              Scalia, J., dissenting.
              97-1139 Dissent U. S. Rodriguez-Moreno Venue
              Scalia,J. Criminal-law 18USC924(c)(1)

R042O.pdf     04/01/99     25843 bytes  (7 hits)
              R042-O; 3/30/99.  Venue in a prosecution for
              using or carrying a firearm during and in
              relation to any crime of violence is proper in
              any district where the crime of violence was
              committed.  Thomas, J., opinion.
              97-1139 Opinion U. S. Rodriguez-Moreno Venue
              Thomas,J. Criminal-law 18USC924(c)(1)

952074c1.pdf  03/18/99     34012 bytes  (14 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Justice Scalia, concurring.

952074d1.pdf  03/18/99      9302 bytes  (16 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Justice Souter, dissenting.

952074d2.pdf  03/18/99      7265 bytes  (3 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Justice Breyer, dissenting.

952074zc.pdf  03/18/99      7268 bytes  (5 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Justice Stevens, concurring.

952074zd.pdf  03/18/99     71040 bytes  (6 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Justice O'Connor, dissenting.

952074zo.pdf  03/18/99     89059 bytes  (8 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Justice Kennedy, opinion.

952074zs.pdf  03/18/99     26439 bytes  (10 hits)
              City of Boerne, Petitioner v. P.F. Flores,
              Archbishop of San Antonio, and United States
              On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
              of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. June 25, 1997.
              Syllabus.

R033.pdf      03/11/99     22776 bytes  (22 hits)
              R033; 3/3/99.  LaGrand has waived his claim that
              execution by lethal gas violates the Eighth
              Amendment, and he has procedurally defaulted that
              claim and the ineffective assistance of counsel
              claim that he raised in this habeas corpus
              petition.  Per Curiam.
              98-1412 PerCuriam Stewart LaGrand Habeas-corpus
              Execution Eighth-Amdt.

R034.pdf      03/11/99     36139 bytes  (17 hits)
              R034; 3/8/99.  Abusive filer is prospectively
              denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on all
              certiorari petitions in noncriminal matters.  Per
              Curiam.
              98-7771 Schwarz National-Security-Agency
              Executive-Off.-of-President 98-7782 PerCuriam IFP
              abusive-filings

R026.pdf      03/04/99     11348 bytes  (18 hits)
              R026; 3/2/99. Title 18 USC §2119's "with the
              intent to cause death or serious bodily harm"
              phrase does not require the Government to prove
              that a carjacker had an unconditional intent to
              kill or harm in all events, but merely requires
              proof of such an intent if necessary to effect a
              carjacking.  Syllabus.
              97-7164

R026A.pdf     03/04/99     37248 bytes  (6 hits)
              R026A; 3/2/99. Title 18 USC §2119's "with the
              intent to cause death or serious bodily harm"
              phrase does not require the Government to prove
              that a carjacker had an unconditional intent to
              kill or harm in all events, but merely requires
              proof of such an intent if necessary to effect a
              carjacking.  Scalia, J., dissenting.
              Dissent Holloway U. S. Scalia,J. 18USC2119
              Carjacking Mens-rea

R026B.pdf     03/04/99      7342 bytes  (12 hits)
              R026B; 3/2/99. Title 18 USC §2119's "with the
              intent to cause death or serious bodily harm"
              phrase does not require the Government to prove
              that a carjacker had an unconditional intent to
              kill or harm in all events, but merely requires
              proof of such an intent if necessary to effect a
              carjacking.  Thomas, J., dissenting.
              Dissent Holloway U. S. Thomas,J. 18USC2119
              Carjacking Mens-rea

R026O.pdf     03/04/99     39615 bytes  (11 hits)
              R026-O; 3/2/99. Title 18 USC §2119's "with the
              intent to cause death or serious bodily harm"
              phrase does not require the Government to prove
              that a carjacker had an unconditional intent to
              kill or harm in all events, but merely requires
              proof of such an intent if necessary to effect a
              carjacking.  Stevens, J., opinion.
              Opinion Holloway U. S. Stevens,J. 18USC2119
              Carjacking Mens-rea

R028.pdf      03/04/99     10468 bytes  (9 hits)
              R028; 3/2/99.  A State generally may impose a
              nondiscriminatory tax on a private company's
              proceeds from contracts with the Government,
              regardless of whether the federal contractor
              renders its services on an Indian reservation. 
              Syllabus.
              97-1536 Syllabus Arizona-Dept.-of-Revenue
              Blaze-Constr.-Co. Tax-immunity Thomas,J. Indians
              Govt.-contractor

R028O.pdf     03/04/99     23576 bytes  (9 hits)
              R028-O; 3/2/99.  A State generally may impose a
              nondiscriminatory tax on a private company's
              proceeds from contracts with the Government,
              regardless of whether the federal contractor
              renders its services on an Indian reservation. 
              Thomas, J., opinion.
              97-1536 Opinion Arizona-Dept.-of-Revenue
              Blaze-Constr.-Co. Tax-immunity Thomas,J. Indians
              Govt.-contractor

R029.pdf      03/04/99     18068 bytes  (13 hits)
              R029; 3/3/99. A private insurer's decision, as
              authorized by Pennsylvania law, to withhold
              workers' compensation medical payments pending
              administrative review is not state action under
              the Fourteenth Amendment; nor does the state
              regime deprive disabled employees of "property"
              under the Due Process Clause.  Syllabus. 
              97-2000 Syllabus Amer.-Mfrs.-Mut.-Ins.-Co.
              Sullivan Rehnquist,C.J. Workers'-Compensation
              State-action Due-process

R029A.pdf     03/04/99      9639 bytes  (8 hits)
              R029A; 3/3/99. A private insurer's decision, as
              authorized by Pennsylvania law, to withhold
              workers' compensation medical payments pending
              administrative review is not state action under
              the Fourteenth Amendment; nor does the state
              regime deprive disabled employees of "property"
              under the Due Process Clause.  Ginsburg, J.,
              concurring in part and concurring in the
              judgment.
              97-2000 Concur Amer.-Mfrs.-Mut.-Ins.-Co. Sullivan
              Ginsburg,J. Workers'-Compensation State-action
              Due-process

R029B.pdf     03/04/99      7901 bytes  (9 hits)
              R029B; 3/3/99. A private insurer's decision, as
              authorized by Pennsylvania law, to withhold
              workers' compensation medical payments pending
              administrative review is not state action under
              the Fourteenth Amendment; nor does the state
              regime deprive disabled employees of "property"
              under the Due Process Clause.  Breyer, J.,
              concurring in part and concurring in the
              judgment.
              97-2000 Concur Amer.-Mfrs.-Mut.-Ins.-Co. Sullivan
              Breyer,J. Workers'-Compensation State-action
              Due-process

R029C.pdf     03/04/99     13074 bytes  (7 hits)
              R029C; 3/3/99. A private insurer's decision, as
              authorized by Pennsylvania law, to withhold
              workers' compensation medical payments pending
              administrative review is not state action under
              the Fourteenth Amendment; nor does the state
              regime deprive disabled employees of "property"
              under the Due Process Clause.  Stevens, J.,
              concurring in part and dissenting in part.
              97-2000 Concur/Dissent Amer.-Mfrs.-Mut.-Ins.-Co.
              Sullivan Stevens,J. Workers'-Compensation
              State-action Due-process

R029O.pdf     03/04/99     67529 bytes  (5 hits)
              R029-O; 3/3/99. A private insurer's decision, as
              authorized by Pennsylvania law, to withhold
              workers' compensation medical payments pending
              administrative review is not state action under
              the Fourteenth Amendment; nor does the state
              regime deprive disabled employees of "property"
              under the Due Process Clause.  Rehnquist, C. J.,
              opinion.
              97-2000 Opinion Amer.-Mfrs.-Mut.-Ins.-Co.
              Sullivan Rehnquist,C.J. Workers'-Compensation
              State-action Due-process

R030.pdf      03/04/99     12903 bytes  (26 hits)
              R030; 3/3/99.  The Individuals with Disabilities
              Education Act requires petitioner school district
              to provide respondent, a ventilator-dependent
              student, with the continuous nursing services he
              requires during the school day.  Syllabus.
              96-1793

R030A.pdf     03/04/99     30697 bytes  (19 hits)
              R030A; 3/3/99.  The Individuals with Disabilities
              Education Act requires petitioner school district
              to provide respondent, a ventilator-dependent
              student, with the continuous nursing services he
              requires during the school day.  Thomas, J.,
              dissenting.
              96-1793

R030O.pdf     03/04/99     46846 bytes  (19 hits)
              R030-O; 3/3/99.  The Individuals with
              Disabilities Education Act requires petitioner
              school district to provide respondent, a
              ventilator-dependent student, with the continuous
              nursing services he requires during the school
              day.  Stevens, J., opinion.
              96-1793

R031.pdf      03/04/99     11535 bytes  (12 hits)
              R031; 3/3/99.  The Federal Service
              Labor-Management Relations Statute delegates to
              the Federal Labor Relations Authority the legal
              power to determine whether the parties must
              engage in midterm bargaining or bargaining about
              midterm bargaining.  Syllabus.
              97-1184 Syllabus Federal-Employees
              Department-of-Interior 97-1243 Breyer,J.
              Collective-bargaining Labor-law

R031A.pdf     03/04/99     38249 bytes  (8 hits)
              R031A; 3/3/99.  The Federal Service
              Labor-Management Relations Statute delegates to
              the Federal Labor Relations Authority the legal
              power to determine whether the parties must
              engage in midterm bargaining or bargaining about
              midterm bargaining.  O'Connor, J., dissenting.
              97-1184 Federal-Employees Dissent
              Department-of-Interior 97-1243 O'Connor,J.
              Collective-bargaining Labor-law

R031O.pdf     03/04/99     47770 bytes  (4 hits)
              R031-O; 3/3/99.  The Federal Service
              Labor-Management Relations Statute delegates to
              the Federal Labor Relations Authority the legal
              power to determine whether the parties must
              engage in midterm bargaining or bargaining about
              midterm bargaining.  Breyer, J., opinion.
              97-1184 Federal-Employees Opinion
              Department-of-Interior 97-1243 Breyer,J.
              Collective-bargaining Labor-law

R025.pdf      02/24/99     11491 bytes  (26 hits)
              R025; 2/24/99.   Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(g), which
              was instituted by the Illegal Immigration Reform
              and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)
              and severely restricts judicial review of
              deportation proceedings, deprives the federal
              courts of jurisdiction over respondents'
              selective-enforcement claim pending on IIRIRA's
              effective date.  Syllabus.
              97-1252 Syllabus Reno American-Arab 8USC1252(g)
              Deportation Immigration Scalia,J.

R025A.pdf     02/24/99     28670 bytes  (15 hits)
              R025A; 2/24/99.   Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(g),
              which was instituted by the Illegal Immigration
              Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
              (IIRIRA) and severely restricts judicial review
              of deportation proceedings, deprives the federal
              courts of jurisdiction over respondents'
              selective-enforcement claim pending on IIRIRA's
              effective date.  Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
              and concurring in the judgment.
              97-1252 Concur Reno American-Arab 8USC1252(g)
              Deportation Immigration Ginsburg,J.

R025B.pdf     02/24/99     15285 bytes  (8 hits)
              R025B; 2/24/99.   Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(g),
              which was instituted by the Illegal Immigration
              Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
              (IIRIRA) and severely restricts judicial review
              of deportation proceedings, deprives the federal
              courts of jurisdiction over respondents'
              selective-enforcement claim pending on IIRIRA's
              effective date.  Stevens, J., concurring in the
              judgment.
              97-1252 Concur Reno American-Arab 8USC1252(g)
              Deportation Immigration Stevens,J.

R025C.pdf     02/24/99     39592 bytes  (4 hits)
              R025C; 2/24/99.   Title 8 U. S. C. §1252(g),
              which was instituted by the Illegal Immigration
              Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996