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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)EFinal Op  ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: unreasonable suit, or one instituted in bad faith. Ibid. As we have  uB already explained, supra, at 9!10, such is too narrow a view of the purposes of the Copyright Act because it fails to adequately consider  uBc the important role played by copyright defendants. See also, Cohen  uB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F.Supp., at 621!622 (tracing the evolution of the Second Circuit's dual standard rule and conclud uB ing that earlier cases upon which it supposedly rests do not require bad faith or frivolousness" [the dual standard rule] is the culmi uB nation of a long line of bootstrapping from nothing to something).  This is hardly the sort of uniform construction which Congress might have endorsed.  In summary, neither of the two studies presented to Congress, nor the cases referred to by the studies, support respondent's view that there was a settled construction in favor of the dual standard under  ! 116 of the 1909 Copyright Act.  We thus reject each of respondent's three arguments in support of the dual standard. We now turn to petitioner's argument that   ! 505 was intended to adopt the British Rule. Petitioner argues that, consistent with the neutral language of  ! 505, both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be awarded attorney's fees as a matter of course, absent exceptional circumstances. For two reasons we reject this argument for the British Rule. 8X%"  Ԍ First, just as the plain language of  ! 505 supports petitioner's claim for disapproving the dual standard, it cuts against him in arguing for the British Rule. The statute says that the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs. The word may clearly connotes discretion. The automatic awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party would pretermit the exercise of that discretion.  Second, we are mindful that Congress legislates against the strong background of the American Rule. Unlike Britain where counsel fees are regularly awarded to the prevailing party, it is the general rule in this country that unless Congress provides otherwise, parties  J are to bear their own attorney's fees. Alyeska Pipeline  J Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247!262 (1975) (tracing the origins and development of the American  J Rule); Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S., at 758. While   ! 505 is one situation in which Congress has modified the American Rule to allow an award of attorney's fees in the court's discretion, we find it impossible to believe that Congress, without more, intended to adopt the British Rule. Such a bold departure from traditional practice would have surely drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative com J@ ment. Cf., Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ( Statutes which invade the common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of longestablished and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident). Not surprisingly, no court has held that  m! 505 (or its predecessor statute) adopted the British Rule.  Thus we reject both the dual standard adopted by several of the Courts of Appeals, and petitioner's claim that  H ! 505 enacted the British Rule for automatic recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party. Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike, but attorney's fees are to be awarded to`"   prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion. There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations, but instead equitable discretion should be exercised in light of the consider J` ations we have identified. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461  J8 U.S. 424, 436!437 (1983).r8; uB ԍ &  XgEpXFrSome courts following the evenhanded standard have suggested  uBW several nonexclusive factors to guide courts' discretion. For example, the Third Circuit has listed several nonexclusive factors that courts should consider in making awards of attorney's fees to any prevailing party. These factors include frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensa uB tion and deterrence.  Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (CA3 1986). We agree that such factors may be used to guide courts' discretion, so long as such factors are faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act and are applied to prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in an evenhanded manner. r Because the Court of Appeals erroneously held petitioner, the prevailing defendant, to a more stringent standard than that applicable to a prevailing plaintiff, its judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  JH ` BIt is so ordered.