WPCpL 2BBcR Z3#|o "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2c  ("m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hROutline-DftftTo set up outline texto_ I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a)ҲOutlneB-DftOutline with Bullets  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)-*+x-*+x-*+xҲOutlneN-DftOutline with numbers [ I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1.Ҳ2@%c N! .!2#"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hRBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote v C   (  Cd  ( ( ( Opin InitInitial Opinion codes pЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)5 EllipsisParagraph Ellipsis<;X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC< Idaho or Ninth Circuit case law. Id., at 866. The District Court accordingly granted summary judgment for the officers on qualified immunity grounds. See,  J e.  ! g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (officials are shielded from liability for civil damages#""#  insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known).  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noticed precedent in  J` point missed in the District Court: United States v. Al J8 Azzawy, 784 F. 2d 890 (CA9 1985), cert. denied, 476  J U.S. 1144 (1986). AlAzzawy, the Court of Appeals observed, involved a suspect seized outside his sur J rounded home. The AlAzzawy decision, published over a year before Elder's arrest, might have alerted a reasonable officer to the constitutional implications of putting a suspect under arrest after he had come outside his house pursuant to an order to exit. 975 F. 2d 1388,  J 1391!1392 (CA9 1991).[ i uB` ԍ   XgEpXFrElder's brief in the Court of Appeals did cite AlAzzawy, albeit without elaboration. Brief for Appellant in No. 91!35146 (CA9), p. 9.  uB There was cause for Elder's caution: The ultimate holding of AlAzzawy was that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. Cf. n.  uB< 1, supra.[ Indeed, Al!Azzawy explicitly reaffirmed the rule that `it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that  J determines whether an arrest occurs within a home.' [Al JX Azzawy, supra, at 893] (quoting United States v. John J0 son, 626 F. 2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other  J grounds, 457 U.S. 537 ... (1982)). 975 F. 2d, at 1391.  J  Elder could not benefit from the rule reaffirmed in Al J Azzawy, the Court of Appeals believed, because that precedent had been unearthed too late. For the conclusion that cases unmentioned in the District Court could not control on appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on  J Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984), in particular, on  J this statement from Davis: A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified  JP immunity only by showing that those rights were clearlyP#"    J established at the time of the conduct at issue. Id., at 197 (emphasis added).  Although typing the qualified immunity inquiry a `pure question[] of law,' g  975 F. 2d, at 1392 (quoting  J` Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F. 2d 624, 627!628 (CA9  J8 1991)), the Court of Appeals read Davis to require plaintiffs to put into the district court record, as legal facts, the cases showing that the right asserted was clearly established. 975 F. 2d, at 1394. Just as appellants forfeit facts not presented to the court of first instance, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, so, in the peculiar context of civil rights qualified immunity litigation, a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from precedent neither he nor the district court itself mentioned in the first instance: [T]he plaintiff's burden in responding to a request for judgment based on qualified immunity is to identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the [district] court can determine whether  J0 the right allegedly violated was clearly established. Id., at 1392.  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them from undue interference with their duties and from potentially  J disabling threats of liability. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,  J supra, at 806. The rule announced by the Ninth Circuit does not aid this objective because its operation is unpredictable in advance of the district court's adjudication. Nor does the rule further the interests on the other side of the balance: deterring public officials' unlawful actions and compensating victims of such conduct. Instead, it simply releases defendants because of shortages in counsels' or the court's legal research or  Jn briefing.ni uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The Ninth Circuit's rule could have a number of untoward"## effects. It could occasion appellate affirmation of incorrect legal results, see 984 F. 2d 991, 998!999 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc), and it could place defense counsel in a trying situation. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a) (1989 ed.) ( A lawyer shall not knowingly: ... (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.).nH"  Ԍ In thinking its rule compelled by this Court's instruc J tion, the Ninth Circuit misconstrued Davis v. Scherer.  J The Court held in Davis that an official's clear violation of a state administrative regulation does not allow a   ! 1983 plaintiff to overcome the official's qualified immunity. Only in this context is the Court's statement comprehensible: A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only  J by showing that those rights were clearly established  Jp .... Davis v. Scherer, supra, at 197 (emphasis added).  JH Davis, in short, concerned not the authorities a court may consider in determining qualified immunity, but this entirely discrete question: Is qualified immunity  J defeated where a defendant violates any clearly established duty, including one under state law, or must the clearly established right be the federal right on which the claim for relief is based? The Court held the latter. 468 U.S., at 193!196, and n. 14; see 984 F. 2d 991, 995 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc).  Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity from suit, presents a question of law, not one of legal  J facts. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528  J (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 818. That question of law, like the generality of such questions,H"    J must be resolved de novo on appeal. See, e. ! g., Pierce v.  J Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should therefore use its full knowledge of its own [and other  J` relevant] precedents. See Davis, 468 U.S., at 192, n. 9.  We leave it to the Court of Appeals to consider, in  J light of all relevant authority, including AlAzzawy, whether the respondent officers are entitled to prevail on their qualified immunity defense. We express no opinion on that ultimate issue, nor do we consider whether the officers' alternate plea of exigent circumstances is tenable. +"* * *  For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J0 ` 3It is so ordered.ă