WPCK 2BBcR Z3#|o"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2c;.02^"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXgn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2Kc = cn@ cC^4G"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<HYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC< Veterans Affairs, supra, at 507!508. 5 is not before us. Nor is there any dispute that the addresses are reasonably available. Therefore, unless disclosure is prohibited by law, agencies such as petitioners must release home addresses to exclusive representatives upon request.  Petitioners contend that the Privacy Act prohibits disclosure. This statute provides in part: BQ (C  , , (  No agency shall disclose any record which is conk"  Ԯtained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be ... (2) required under section 552 of this title [FOIA]. 5 U.S.C.  ! 552a(b)(2) (1988 ed. and Supp. IV).O<BQ d   ( , , The employee addresses sought by the unions are records covered by the broad terms of the Privacy Act. Therefore, unless FOIA would require release of the addresses, their disclosure is prohibited by law, and  J the agencies may not reveal them to the unions. i uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The writtenconsent provision of the Privacy Act is not implicated in this case. The unions already have access to the addresses of their members and to those of nonmembers who have divulged this information to them. It is not disputed that the unions are able to contact bargaining unit employees at work and ask them for their home addresses. In practical effect, the unions seek only those addresses that they do not currently possess: the addresses of nonunion employees who have not revealed this information to their exclusive representative.  We also note that we are not asked in this case to consider the potential applicability of any other Privacy Act exceptions, such as the routine use exception. See 5 U.S.C.  g! 552a(b)(3). Respondents rely solely on the argument that the unions' requests for home addresses fall within the Privacy Act's FOIA exception.  We turn, then, to FOIA. As we have recognized previously, FOIA reflects a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under  J clearly delineated statutory language. Department of  J Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360!361 (1976)  J (internal quotation marks omitted). See also EPA v.  Jl Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79!80 (1973). Thus, while disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of [FOIA], there are a number of exemptions from the statute's  J broad reach. Rose, supra, at 361. The exemption "   potentially applicable to employee addresses is Exemption 6, which provides that FOIA's disclosure requirements do not apply to personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C.   ! 552(b)(6).  Thus, although this case requires us to follow a somewhat convoluted path of statutory crossreferences, its proper resolution depends upon a discrete inquiry: whether disclosure of the home addresses would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of [the] personal privacy of bargaining unit employees within the meaning of FOIA. For guidance in answering this question, we need look no further than to our decision  J in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for  J Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).  J  Reporters Committee involved FOIA requests addressed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation that sought the rap sheets of several individuals. In the process of deciding that the FBI was prohibited from disclosing the contents of the rap sheets, we reaffirmed several basic principles that have informed our interpretation of FOIA. First, in evaluating whether a request for information lies within the scope of a FOIA exemption, such as Exemption 6, that bars disclosure when it would amount to an invasion of privacy that is to some degree unwarranted, a court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the  J [e]xemption to protect. Reporters Committee, supra, at  Jx 776. See also Rose, supra, at 372.  Second, the only relevant public interest in disclosure to be weighed in this balance is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the FOIA, which is contribut[ing] significantly to public under J standing of the operations or activities of the govern J ment. Reporters Committee, supra, at 775 (internal quotation marks omitted). We elaborated on this point`"   at some length: BQ C  , , (  [FOIA's] basic policy of `full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language,' indeed focuses on the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up to. Official information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that statutory purpose. That purpose, however, is not fostered by disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct.  Jc 489 U. S., at 773 (quoting Rose, supra, at 360!361) (other internal quotation marks and citations omitted). DPBQ  d   JO  ( , , See also Rose, supra, at 372 (Exemption 6 cases require a balancing of the individual's right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of [FOIA] to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny ! ) (internal quotation marks omitted).  J  Third, whether an invasion of privacy is warranted cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for  J7 information is made. Reporters Committee, 489 U. S., at 771. Because Congress `clearly intended' the FOIA `to give any member of the public as much right to disclosure as one with a special interest [in a particular  J document],' !  ibid. (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &  Jo Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975)), except in certain cases involving claims of privilege, the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her  J FOIA request. 489 U. S., at 771. ri uB_ ԍOur decision in Reporters Committee turned on the applicability of FOIA Exemption 7(C) to the requests for rap sheets. In pertinent part, Exemption 7(C) provides that [FOIA] does not apply to matters that are ... (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but"## only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C.  ! 552(b)(7)(C). When we applied the FOIA principles discussed in the text, we concluded that [t]he privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rapsheet information will always be high, and that the FOIAbased public interest in disclosure is at its nadir when third parties seek law enforcement records concerning private citizens, given that those records would shed no light on the activities of government agencies or officials.  uB Reporters Committee, 489 U.S., at 780. Because the privacy interest outweighed the relevant public interest, we held as a categorical matter that such records are excepted from FOIA's broad disclosure require uB$ ments by Exemption 7(C). Ibid.  Exemption 7(C) is more protective of privacy than Exemption 6: the former provision applies to any disclosure that could reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of privacy that is unwarranted, while the latter bars any disclosure that would constitute an invasion  uB of privacy that is clearly unwarranted.  FTN   XgEpXFr  ddf < Contrary to the view of the  uBn court below, see 975 F.2d, at 1113, however, the fact that Reporters  uB% Committee dealt with a different FOIA exemption than the one we focus on today is of little import. Exemptions 7(C) and 6 differ in the magnitude of the public interest that is required to override the respective privacy interests protected by the exemptions. As we  uB shall see in Part III, infra, however, the dispositive issue here is the  uB identification of the relevant public interest to be weighed in the  uBo balance, not the magnitude of that interest. Reporters Committee provides the same guidance in making this identification in Exemp uB tion 7(C) and Exemption 6 cases. See, e. q! g., Department of State v.  uB Ray, 502 U.S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 13) (Exemption 6 case  uBK applying Reporters Committee). FTN   XFrXFr ff  4"  Ԍ : H1 y,III؃  J  C  The principles that we followed in Reporters Committee can be applied easily to this case. We must weigh the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their addresses against the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis"the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would she[d] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens know what "    J their government is up to. Reporters Committee, supra, at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The relevant public interest supporting disclosure in this case is negligible, at best. Disclosure of the addresses might allow the unions to communicate more effectively with employees, but it would not appreciably further the citizens' right to be informed about what their government is up to. 489 U.S., at 773 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, such disclosure would reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their activities. Even the Fifth Circuit recognized that [r]elease of the employees' ... addresses would not in any meaningful way open agency action to the light of public scrutiny. 975 F.2d, at 1113.  Apparently realizing that this conclusion follows ineluctably from an application of the FOIA tenets we  J embraced in Reporters Committee, respondents argue  JX that Reporters Committee is largely inapposite here because it dealt with an information request made directly under FOIA, whereas the unions' requests for home addresses initially were made under the Labor Statute, and implicated FOIA only incidentally through a chain of statutory crossreferences. In such a circumstance, contend respondents, to give full effect to the three statutes involved and to allow unions to perform their statutory representational duties, we should import the policy considerations that are made explicit in the Labor Statute into the FOIA Exemption 6 balancing analysis. If we were to do so, respondents are confident we would conclude that the Labor Statute's policy favoring collective bargaining easily outweighs any privacy interest that employees might have in nondisclosure.  We decline to accept respondents' ambitious invitation to rewrite the statutes before us and to disregard the  J FOIA principles reaffirmed in Reporters Committee. The Labor Statute does not, as the Fifth Circuit suggested,` "   merely borro[w] the FOIA's disclosure calculus for another purpose. 975 F.2d, at 1115. Rather, it allows the disclosure of information necessary for effective collective bargaining only to the extent not prohibited by law. 5 U.S.C.  ! 7114(b)(4). Disclosure of the home addresses is prohibited by the Privacy Act unless an exception to that Act applies. The terms of the Labor Statute in no way suggest that the Privacy Act should be read in light of the purposes of the Labor Statute. If there is an exception, therefore, it must be found within the Privacy Act itself. Congress could have enacted an exception to the Privacy Act's coverage for information necessary for collectivebargaining purposes, but it did not do so. In the absence of such a provision, respondents rely on the exception for information the disclosure of which would be required under [FOIA].   ! 552a(b)(2). Nowhere, however, does the Labor Statute amend FOIA's disclosure requirements or grant information requestors under the Labor Statute  J special status under FOIA. oi uBp ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < In this regard, see Department of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d, at 512 ( Nowhere in the [Labor Statute] does its language indicate that the disclosure calculus required by FOIA should be modified. Nowhere do we find a qualification that the policies of collective  uBL bargaining should be integrated into FOIA) FTN   XFrXFr ff ; Department of Treas uB ury, 884 F.2d, at 1453 ( Privacy Act exception b(2) speaks only of FOIA. We do not believe we are entitled to engage in the sort of imaginative reconstruction that would be necessary to introduce collective bargaining values into the [FOIA] balancing process).  Therefore, because all FOIA requestors have an equal, and equally qualified, right to information, the fact that respondents are seeking to vindicate the policies behind the Labor  Jh Statute is irrelevant to the FOIA analysis. Cf. Reporters  J@ Committee, 489 U.S., at 771!772.  J  In her concurring opinion in FLRA v. Department of  J Treasury, Financial Management Serv., 884 F. 2d 1446 (CADC 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1055 (1990), then "  ԫJudge Ginsburg cogently explained why we must reject respondents' central argument: BQ C  , , (  The broad crossreference in 5 U.S.C.   ! 7114(b)(4)"`to the extent not prohibited by law'"picks up the Privacy Act unmodified; that Act, in turn, shelters personal records absent the consent of the person to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure would be required under the [FOIA]. Once placed wholly within the FOIA's domain, the union requesting information relevant to collective bargaining stands in no better position than members of the general public. True, unions have a special interest in identifying and communicating with persons in the bargaining unit, an interest initially accommodated by [the Labor Statute]. The bargaining process facilitation interest is ultimately unavailing, however, because it `falls outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was  Js enacted to serve,' i.e., the interest in advancing `public understanding of the operation or activities  J# of the government.' T!  Id., at 1457 (quoting Reporters  J Committee, supra, at 775).Y{BQ d   ( , ,  Against the virtually nonexistent FOIArelated public interest in disclosure, we weigh the interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home  J addresses. Cf. Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S.  J ___, ___ (1991) (slip op., at 10!11); Rose, 425 U.S., at 372. Because a very slight privacy interest would suffice to outweigh the relevant public interest, we need not be exact in our quantification of the privacy interest. It is enough for present purposes to observe that the employees' interest in nondisclosure is not insubstantial.  It is true that home addresses often are publicly available through sources such as telephone directories and voter registration lists, but [i]n an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or/ "    J another divulged to another. Reporters Committee,  J supra, at 763. The privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 encompass[es] the individual's control of information concerning his or her person. 489 U.S., at 763. An individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form. Here, for the most part, the unions seek to obtain the addresses of nonunion employees who have decided not to reveal their addresses to their exclusive representative. See n.5,  JH supra. Perhaps some of these individuals have failed to join the union that represents them due to lack of familiarity with the union or its services. Others may be opposed to their union or to unionism in general on practical or ideological grounds. Whatever the reason that these employees have chosen not to become members of the union or to provide the union with their  J0 addresses, however, it is clear that they have some nontrivial privacy interest in nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of unionrelated mail, and, perhaps, unionrelated telephone calls or visits, that would follow  J disclosure.qK i uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Even the Authority has recognized that employees have some privacy interest in their home addresses. Brief for Federal Re uBf spondent 41 (citing Department of Navy, Portsmouth Naval Ship uB yard, Portsmouth, N.H., 37 F.L.R.A. 515, 532 (1990)). The Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have reached the same conclusion, although they have differed in their character uBB ization of the magnitude of the interest implicated. See, e. g., FLRA  uB v. Department of Defense, 977 F.2d 545, 549 (CA11 1992) ( impor uB tant privacy interest); FLRA v. Department of Navy, 966 F.2d 747,  uBg 759 (CA3 1992) (en banc) ( minimal interest); Department of Veter uB ans Affairs, supra, at 510 ( general privacy interest in preventing  uB dissemination of home address); Department of Treasury, supra, at 1453 ( significant interest).q  Many people simply do not want to be disturbed ath "   home by workrelated matters. Employees can lessen the chance of such unwanted contacts by not revealing their addresses to their exclusive representative. Even if the direct union/employee communication facilitated by the disclosure of home addresses were limited to mailings, this does not lessen the interest that individuals have in preventing at least some unsolicited, unwanted mail from reaching them at their homes. We are reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws,  Jp and traditions. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office  JH Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970); Olmstead v. United  J States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Moreover, when we consider that other parties, such as commercial advertisers and solicitors, must have the same access under FOIA as the unions to the  J employee address lists sought in this case, see supra, at 8, 11, it is clear that the individual privacy interest that would be protected by nondisclosure is far from insignificant.  Because the privacy interest of bargaining unit employees in nondisclosure of their home addresses substantially outweighs the negligible FOIArelated public interest in disclosure, we conclude that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 5 U.S.C.  D! 552(b)(6). FOIA, thus, does not require the agencies to divulge the addresses, and the Privacy Act, therefore, prohibits their release to the unions.  : H1 ,IV؃  (C  Respondents argue that our decision will have a number of untoward effects. First, they contend that without access to home addresses, public sector unions will be unable to communicate with and represent  J effectively all bargaining unit employees. Such a result, they believe, thwarts the collectivebargaining policies"    J explicitly embodied in the Labor Statute. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.   ! 7101(a) (congressional finding that labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest). According to respondents, it is illogical to believe that Congress intended the Privacy Act and FOIA to be interpreted in a manner that hinders the effectuation of the purposes motivating the Labor Statute.  Respondents, however, place undue emphasis on what they perceive to be the impulses of the Congress that enacted the Labor Statute, and neglect to consider the language in that statute that calls into play the limitations of the Privacy Act. Speculation about the ultimate goals of the Labor Statute is inappropriate here; the statute plainly states that an agency need furnish an exclusive representative with information that is neces J sary for collectivebargaining purposes only to the extent not prohibited by law. 5 U.S.C.  ! 7114(b)(4). Disclosure of the addresses in this case is prohibited by law, the Privacy Act. By disallowing disclosure, we do no more than give effect to the clear words of the provisions we construe, including the Labor Statute. Cf.  J Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 5) ( We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there).  Second, respondents fear that our ruling will allow agencies, acting pursuant to the Privacy Act, to refuse to provide unions with other employee records, such as disciplinary reports and performance appraisals, that the unions need in order to perform their duties as exclusive bargaining representatives. This concern is not presented in this case, however, and we do not address it.  Finally, respondents contend that our decision creates an unnecessary and unintended disparity between public and private sector unions. While private sector unions`"   assertedly are entitled to receive employee home address lists from employers under the National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the National Labor Relations  J Board,R %i uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < See, e.g., NLRB v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 633  uB F.2d 766, 773 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1981); NLRB  uB^ v. Pearl Bookbinding Co., 517 F.2d 1108, 1113 (CA1 1975).R respondents claim that federal sector unions now will be needlessly barred from obtaining this information, despite the lack of any indication that  J Congress intended such a result. See Department of  J Treasury, 884 F.2d, at 1457!1461 (R. Ginsburg, J., concurring). We do not question that, as a general matter, private sector labor law may provide guidance in parallel public sector matters. This fact has little relevance here, however, for unlike private sector employees, federal employees enjoy the protection of the Privacy Act, and that statute prohibits the disclosure of the address lists sought in this case. To the extent that this prohibition leaves public sector unions in a position different from that of their private sector counterparts,  JX Congress may correct the disparity. Cf. Sedima,  J0 S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).  : H1 -V؃  C  For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  J  So ordered.