WPCO 2BcR Z#|o"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2:n/c/cQ3c6New Century SchoolbookTimes RomanTimes Roman BoldNew Century Schoolbook ItalicNew Century Schoolbook Bold"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>12 cH^jKO"m^56=ii,GG\o3=33iiiiiiiiii33ooo\QwzzGoGo\,pwfziGp~DAzA~pzw_\N~pppbGoGo=3============pDpppppfiiiiQDQDQDQD~pppp~~~~ppzppppzpppffffziiiipppppp~~QDQDQDQDwzAAAAA~~~~pp___z\z\z\z\NNN~~~~~~pzbzbzbzA~_z\Nppzp~No3\6\\\iiiCCi?i?,XX\==\\~~,X?ooee3o<.!3 /2 ;5 Ellipsis!X @d XgEp N N  (3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction  J with one or more domestic financial institutions.J uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Regarding enforcement of 5324, the Secretary considered, but did not promulgate, a regulation requiring banks to inform currency transaction customers of the section's proscription. See 53 Fed. Reg. 7948 (1988) (proposing procedures to notify [bank] customers of the provisions to Section 5324 in order to insure compliance with those provisions); 54 Fed. Reg. 20398 (1989) (withdrawing proposal)./2 BQ d   ( , , The criminal enforcement provision at issue, 31 U.S.C.   ! 5322(a), sets out penalties for [a] person willfully  Jt violating, inter alia, the antistructuring provision. Section 5322(a) reads:  BQ $C  , , ( N N  A person willfully violating this subchapter [31  J? U.S.C. 5311 et seq.] or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter (except section 5315 of this title or a regulation prescribed under section 5315)  J shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. ! +: BQ d   ( , ,  DH2 -B؃  C  Section 5324 forbids structuring transactions with a purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a). Ratzlaf admits that he structured cash transactions, and that he did so with knowledge of, and a purpose to avoid, the banks' duty to report currency  J. transactions in excess of $10,000. The statutory formulation (  ! 5322) under which Ratzlaf was prosecuted, however, calls for proof of willful[ness] on the actor's part. The trial judge in Ratzlaf's case, with the Ninth Circuit's approbation, treated  ! 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement essentially as surplusage"as words of no  J> consequence.n>i uB ԍ   XgEpXFrThe United States confirmed at oral argument that, in its view, as in the view of the courts below, the 5324 offense is just what it would be"## if you never had 5322. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. Judges should hesitate so to treat>G"   statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a  J criminal offense. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Public  J Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) (expressing deep reluctance to interpret statutory provisions so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same  J enactment) (citation omitted); cf. Potter v. United States,  J 155 U.S. 438, 446 (1894) (word wilful used to describe certain offenses but not others in same statute cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means something).   Willful, this Court has recognized, is a word of many meanings, and its construction [is] often ...  J influenced by its context. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). Accordingly, we view  ! 5322(a) and 5324(3) mindful of the complex of provisions in which they are embedded. In this light, we count it significant that  0! 5322(a)'s omnibus willfulness requirement, when applied to other provisions in the same subchapter, consistently has been read by the Courts of Appeals to require both knowledge of the reporting  J requirement and a specific intent to commit the crime,  J i.e., a purpose to disobey the law. See United States  J v. Bank of New England, N. A., 821 F. 2d 844, 854!859 (CA1 1987) ( willful violation of  M! 5313's reporting requirement for cash transactions over $10,000 requires voluntary, intentional, and bad purpose to disobey the  J law); United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F. 2d 1540, 1543 (CA11 1984) ( willful violation of  ! 5313's reporting requirement for cash transactions over $10,000 requires `proof of the defendant's knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime'  J( (quoting United States v. Granda, 565 F. 2d 922, 926 (CA5 1978))).G"  Ԍ J  Notable in this regard are 31 U.S. C.  ! 5314,Ji uBh ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Section 5314 provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall require a resident or citizen of the United States or a person in, and doing business in, the United States, to keep records, file reports, or keep records and file reports, when the resident, citizen, or person makes a transaction or maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial agency. concerning records and reports on monetary transactions  J with foreign financial agencies, and  `! 5316, i uBb ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Section 5316 requires the filing of reports prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury when a person or an agent or bailee of the person... knowingly (1) transports, is about to transport, or has transported, monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one time into, or out of, the United States. concerning declaration of the transportation of more than $10,000 into, or out of, the United States. Decisions involving these provisions describe a willful actor as one who  J violates a known legal duty. See, e.g ! ., United States  J v. Sturman, 951 F. 2d 1466, 1476!1477 (CA6 1991) ( willful violation of  ! 5314's reporting requirement for foreign financial transactions requires proof of `voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty'  JH (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201  J (1991))); United States v. Warren, 612 F. 2d 887, 890 (CA5 1980) ( willful violation of  M! 5316's reporting requirement for transportation of currency across international boundaries requires that defendant have  J actually known of the currency reporting requirement and have voluntarily and intentionally violated that  J0 known legal duty); United States v. Dichne, 612 F. 2d 632, 636 (CA2 1979) ( willful violation of  ! 5316's reporting requirement for transportation of currency across international boundaries requires proof of defendant's  h  `knowledge of the reporting requirement and his  Jh specific intent to commit the crime'   (quoting Granda,  J@ supra, at 926)); Granda, supra, at 924!926 (overturning conviction for willful violation of 5316 because jurym "   was not given proper instruction [that] would include some discussion of defendant's ignorance of the law and rejecting Government's contention that the statutory provisions do not require that the defendant be aware  J` of the fact that he is breaking the law). `i uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf <  [S]pecific intent to commit the crime[s] described in 31 U.S.C.  uB 5313, 5314, and 5316 might be negated by, e.g., proof that defen uB6 dant relied in good faith on advice of counsel. See United States v.  uB Eisenstein, 731 F. 2d 1540, 1543!1544 (CA11 1984).  A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears.  J See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S.  J ___, ___ (1992). We have even stronger cause to  J construe a single formulation, here  "! 5322(a), the same  Jp way each time it is called into play. See United States  JH v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d 493, 498 (CA1 1993) (en banc) ( Ascribing various meanings to a single iteration of [  ! 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement]"reading the word differently for each code section to which it applies" would open Pandora's jar. If courts can render meaning so malleable, the usefulness of a single penalty provision for a group of related code sections will be evisceratedand ... almost any code section that references a group of other code sections would become susceptible to individuated interpretation.).  The United States urges, however, that  }! 5324 violators, by their very conduct, exhibit a purpose to do wrong, which suffices to show willfulness:  BQ @C  , , ( N N  On occasion, criminal statutes"including some requiring proof of `willfulness'"have been understood to require proof of an intentional violation of a  J  known legal duty, i.e., specific knowledge by the  J defendant that his conduct is unlawful. But where that construction has been adopted, it has been invoked only to ensure that the defendant actedl "    J with a wrongful purpose. See Liparota v. United  J States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) ...._ BQ d   ( , ,  <5 EllipsisXgEpX @d P P .tt%.-.4.;.!Eb ;5 Ellipsis!X @d XgEp BQ C   , , ( N N  The antistructuring statute, 31 U.S.C. 5324, satisfies the `bad purpose' component of willfulness by explicitly defining the wrongful purpose necessary to violate the law: it requires proof that the defendant acted with the purpose to evade the reporting requirement of Section 5313(a). Brief for United States 23!25.ud BQ ?d   ( , ,    , ! `[S]tructuring is not the kind of activity that an ordinary person would engage in innocently,'   the United  J+ States asserts. Id., at 29 (quoting United States v.  J Hoyland, 914 F. 2d 1125, 1129 (CA9 1990)). It is therefore reasonable, the Government concludes, to hold a structurer responsible for evading the reporting requirements without the need to prove specific knowledge that such evasion is unlawful. Brief for United States 29.  Undoubtedly there are bad men who attempt to elude official reporting requirements in order to hide from Government inspectors such criminal activity as launder J ing drug money or tax evasion. K i uB ԍ &  XgEpXFrOn brief, the United States attempted to link Ratzlaf to other bad conduct, describing at some length his repeated failure to report gambling income in his income tax returns. Brief for United States 5!7. Ratzlaf was not prosecuted, however, for these alleged misdeeds. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35!36. Nor has the Government ever asserted that Ratzlaf was engaged in other conduct Congress sought principally to check through the legislation in question"not gambling at licensed casinos, but laundering money proceeds from drug sales or other criminal ventures. See S. Rep. No. 99!433, p 1!2 (1986) (purpose of Act creating 5324 is to provide Federal law enforcement agencies with additional tools to investigate money laundering [and to] curb the spread of money laundering, by which criminals have successfully disguised the nature and source of funds from their illegal enterprises). But currency struc "  Ԯturing is not inevitably nefarious. Consider, for example, the small business operator who knows that reports filed under 31 U. S. C.  ! 5313(a) are available to the Internal Revenue Service. To reduce the risk of an IRS audit, she brings $9,500 in cash to the bank twice each week, in lieu of transporting over $10,000 once each week. That person, if the United States is right, has committed a criminal offense, because she structured cash transactions for the specific purpose of depriving the Government of the information that Section 5313(a)  Jp is designed to obtain. Brief for United States 28!29. pi uB ԍ &  XgEpXFrAt oral argument, the United States recognized that, under its reading of the legislation, the entrepreneur in this example, absent  uBF special exemption, would be subject to prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32!34. Nor is a person who structures a currency transaction invariably motivated by a desire to keep the Government in the dark. But under the Government's construction an individual would commit a felony against the United States by making cash deposits in small doses, fearful that the bank's reports would increase the likelihood of  JX burglary, &Xli uB ԍ &  XgEpXFrSee United States v. Dollar Bank Money Market Account No.  uBS 1591768456, 980 F. 2d 233, 241 (CA3 1992) (forfeiture action under 18 U.S.C.   ! 981(a)(1)(A) [involving a cash gift deposited by the donee in several steps to avoid bank's reporting requirement]; court overturned grant of summary judgment in Government's favor, noting that jury could believe donee's legitimate explanations for organizing his deposits in amounts under $10,000, including respect for donor's privacy and fear that information regarding the donor"an eccentric old woman [who] hid hundreds of thousands of dollars in her house"might lead to burglary attempts). or in an endeavor to keep a former spouse  J0 unaware of his wealth.%0 i uB ԍ &  XgEpXFrSee Aversa, 984 F. 2d, at 495 (real estate partners feared that paper trail from currency transaction reports would obviate efforts to hide existence of cash from spouse of one of the partners).  Courts have noted many occasions on which persons, without violating any law, may structure transactions "   in order to avoid the impact of some regulation or tax.  J United States v. Aversa, 762 F. Supp. 441, 446 (NH 1991), aff'd in part, 984 F. 2d 493 (CA1 1993). This Court, over a century ago, supplied an illustration:  BQ `C  , , (  The Stamp Act of 1862 imposed a duty of two cents upon a bankcheck, when drawn for an amount not less than 20 dollars. A careful individual, having the amount of twenty dollars to pay, pays the same by handing to his creditor two checks of ten dollars each. He thus draws checks in payment of his debt to the amount of twenty dollars, and yet pays no stamp duty.... While his operations deprive the government of the duties it might reasonably expect to receive, it is not perceived that the practice is open to the charge of fraud. He resorts to devices to avoid the payment of duties, but they are not illegal. He has the legal right to split up his evidences of payment, and thus to avoid the tax.  Js United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 506 (1873).{ BQ sd   J  ( , , In current days, as an amicus noted, countless taxpayers each year give a gift of $10,000 on December 31 and an identical gift the next day, thereby legitimately avoiding the taxable gifts reporting required by 26 U. S. C.  J   ! 2503(b).#i uBw ԍ &  XgEpXFrThe statute provides that [i]n the case of gifts... made to any person by [a] donor during [a] calendar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to such person shall not... be included in the total amount of gifts made during such year. 26 U.S.C.  ! 2503(b).# See Brief for National Association of  J Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 16.  In light of these examples, we are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously evil or inherently bad that the willfulness requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring. Had Congress wished to dispense with the requirement, it could have furnished the l"    J appropriate instruction.[i uBh ԍ &  XgEpXFrCongress did provide for civil forfeiture without any willfulness requirement in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. See 18 U.S.C.   ! 981(a) (subjecting to forfeiture [a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction... in violation of section 5313(a) or 5324(a) of title 31...); see also 31 U.S.C.  ! 5317(a) (subjecting to forfeiture any monetary instrument... being transported[when] a report on the instrument under section 5316 of this title has not been filed or contains a material omission or misstatement).[  DH2 -C؃  C  In  R ! 5322, Congress subjected to criminal penalties only those willfully violating  q! 5324, signaling its intent to require for conviction proof that the defendant knew not only of the bank's duty to report cash transactions in excess of $10,000, but also of his duty not to avoid triggering such a report. There are, we recognize,  J contrary indications in the statute's legislative history.q(Hi uB# ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The United States points to one of the Senate Reports accompanying the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, which stated that a person who converts $18,000 in currency to cashier's checks by purchasing two $9,000 cashier's checks at two different banks or on two different days with the specific intent that the participating bank or banks not be required to file Currency Transaction Reports for those transactions, would be subject to potential civil and criminal liability. S. Rep. No. 99!433, p. 22 (1986), cited in Brief for United States 35. The same Report also indicated that  ! 5324  uB  would codify [United States v.] TobonBuiles[, 706 F. 2d 1092 (CA11 1983)] and like cases [by] expressly subject[ing] to potential liability a person who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a financial institution to file a required report that contains material omissions or misstate uB% ments of fact. S. Rep. No. 99!433, at 22, cited in Brief for United States 33.  But the legislative history cited by the United States is hardly  uBJ crystalline. The reference to United States v. TobonBuiles, 706 F.  uB 2d 1092 (CA11 1983), is illustrative. In that case, the defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C.  ! 1001, the False Statements Act, with conceal[ing]... the existence, source, and transfer of approximately $185,200 in cash by purchasing approximately twentyone cashier's checks in amounts less than $10,000 [and] using a variety"##  uB of names, including false names.... 706 F. 2d, at 1094. The defendant's main contention, rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, was that he could not have violated the concealment prohibition of  y ! 1001 because he was under no legal duty to report any of his cash  uBl transactions. Id., at 1096. No ignorance of the law defense was asserted. Congress may indeed have codified that decision in  y ! 5324 by expressly subject[ing] to potential liability a person who causes or attempts to cause a financial institution to fail to file a required report or who causes a financial institution to file a required report that contains material omissions or misstatements of  uB fact, S. Rep. No. 99!433, p. 22 (1986), but it appears that Con uBm gress did so in the first and second subsections of  >! 5324, which track the Senate Report language almost verbatim. See 31 U.S.C.  y ! 5324(1) (no person shall cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report required under section  uBI 5313(a)); 31 U.S.C.  ! 5324(2) (no person shall cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report required under section 5313(a) that contains a material omission or misstatement of  uBn fact). Indeed, the Senate Report stated that [i]n addition to  uB% codifying TobonBuiles, 5324 would also create the offense of structuring a transaction to evade the reporting requirements. S.  uB Rep. No. 99!433, p. 22. The relevance of TobonBuiles to the proper construction of  ! 5324(3), the subsection under which Ratzlaf was convicted, is not evident.  "   But we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a  J statutory text that is clear. i uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (appeals to legislative history are well taken only to resolve statutory ambi uB guity). See also United States v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d, at 499, n. 8 (commenting that legislative history of provisions here at issue  ! `is more conflicting than the [statutory] text is ambiguous,' h!  quoting  uB Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950)). As the First Circuit noted, no House, Senate, or Conference Report accompanied the final version of the AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986; instead, over 20 separate reports accompanied various proposed bills, portions of which were incorporated into that Act. See 1986 U. S. C. C. A. N. 5393 (listing reports).  uBE  The dissent, see post, at 12, features a House Report issued in 1991 in connection with an unenacted version of the AnnunzioWylie AntiMoney Laundering Act. We do not find that Report, commenting on a bill that did not pass, a secure indicator of congressionalj"## intent at any time, and it surely affords no reliable guide to  uBG ԚCongress' intent in 1986. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (cautioning against giving weight to history written years after the passage of a statute). Moreover, were we to l"   find  4 ! 5322(a)'s willfulness requirement ambiguous as applied to  T! 5324, we would resolve any doubt in favor  J of the defendant. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (lenity principles demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defend J8 ant); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990) ( Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader than that clearly  Jp warranted by the text.); United States v. Bass, 404  JH U.S. 336, 347!350 (1971) (rule of lenity premised on concepts that  d! `fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed'  !  and that legislatures and not courts should  J define criminal activity) (quoting McBoyle v. United  JX States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.)).  We do not dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a  J criminal charge. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.  J 192, 199 (1991); Barlow v. United States, 7 Pet. 404, 410!412 (1833) (Story, J.). In particular contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That, we hold, is what Congress has done with respect to 31 U.S.C. 5322(a) and the provisions it controls. To convict Ratzlaf of the crime with which he was charged, violation of 31 U.S.C.  ! 5322(a) and 5324(3), the jury had to find he knew the structuring in which he engaged  Jx was unlawful.n xli uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The dissent asserts that our holding largely nullifies the effect of 5324 by mak[ing] prosecution for structuring difficult or imposs"##Ԯ uB sible in most cases. See post, at 14. Even under the dissent's reading of the statute, proof that the defendant knew of the bank's duty to report is required for conviction; we fail to see why proof that the defendant knew of his duty to refrain from structuring is so qualitatively different that it renders prosecution impossible. A jury may, of course, find the requisite knowledge on defendant's part by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant's  uB conduct, see Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499!500 (1943) (illustrating conduct that can support permissible inference of an  uB  affirmative willful attempt to evade a tax); United States v. Bank  uB of New England, N. A., 821 F. 2d 844, 854 (CA1 1987) (willfulness is usually established by drawing reasonable inferences from the available facts), and the Government has not found it impossible to persuade a jury to make such inferences in prosecutions for  uB willful violations of 5313, 5314, or 5316. See, e.g., United States  uBI v. Dichne, 612 F. 2d 632, 636!638 (CA2 1979) (evidence that Government took affirmative steps to bring the reporting requirement to the defendant's attention by means of visual notices supports inference that defendant willfully violated 5316). Because the jury was not properlyx%"   instructed in this regard, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J 3 It is so ordered.